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The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was initially
proposed as the "trade liberalizing cornerstone" of President
George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, a broad-
scale plan to "unify the Western Hemisphere" enacted in 1990.1
The process of creating an FTAA actually began, however, with
the first "Summit of the Americas" held in Miami in 1994, at
which the thirty-four democracies of the Western Hemisphere' -
essentially the entire hemisphere minus Cuba' - committed them-
selves to pursuing the creation of an FTAA by 2005.' The Plan of
Action adopted at the first Summit of the Americas addresses a
broad range of concerns beyond trade, with goals including the
promotion of democracy, the fight against corruption and drug
trafficking, the elimination of poverty, cooperation in science and
technology, universal access to education, and the achievement of
gender equality.' This linkage of hemispheric free trade with
democratic values primarily reflects the perspective of American
policy-makers, who locate the emergence of the effort toward an
FTAA in a post-Cold War, pan-hemispheric "consensus of the citi-
zen rather than the state as the source of law and policy."'
Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") under
President Bill Clinton, pointed to the decline of "mercantilism" in
Latin America, and stated that "[miost governments in the hemi-
1. J. Steven Jarreau, Negotiating Trade Liberalization in the Western
Hemisphere: The Free Trade Area of the Americas, 13.1 TEMPLE IN r'L & COMP. L.J. 57,
57 (1999); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). Efforts to unite the Western Hemisphere
are not a recent development, "dat[ing] to the days of Simon Bolivar and the Pan
American Congress of 1826." Jarreau, supra, at 57 (citation omitted); see also
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Keynote Address, 30 LAw & POL'¥ INT'L BUS. 1, 1-2
(1999) (Symposium: The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the
Americas).
2. The negotiating nations are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay, the United States of America, and Venezuela. See Denver Ministerial
Declaration, at n.1, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/denver-e.asp (official
website of the FTAA) (last visited Oct. 18, 2000).
3. Lenin Guerra, The Use of Fast Track Authority in the Negotiations of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas, 8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 172, 174 (1999); see also infra
text accompanying notes 50-51. French Guiana, a part of France, also is not
participating. See All In the Familia, EcoNoMisT, Apr. 21, 2001, at 19, 19.
4. Overview of the FTAA Process, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/viewe.asp (last
visited Mar. 10, 2002).
5. Plan of Action, httpY/www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/plan-e.asp (last visited
Sept. 22, 2000).
6. Barshefsky, supra note 1, at 3.
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sphere now agree in principle that economic development is best
achieved through freedom, open markets and entrepreneurialism
rather than detailed guidance by the state in favor of one group or
another."7 Barshefsky's comments refer to a general trend in
Latin America over recent decades away from protectionist
"import-substitution strategies" toward trade liberalization and
an "outward oriented development strategy."8 Robert Zoellick,
USTR under President George W. Bush, describes the FTAA effort
in similar terms: "[L]ook at the Americas today - democracy in
every nation but one, a hemispheric free trade agreement on its
way, and the triumph of open markets in the battle of ideas."9
An FTAA would clearly be of great economic significance to all
negotiating nations. For Latin America, the FTAA brings the
promise of increased access to capital, technology, and an
immense market." The size of the U.S. economy relative to the
rest of the hemisphere sheds some light on the value of U.S. mar-
ket access. According to the World Bank, total gross domestic
7. Id. Mario Esteban Carranza more fully describes "the 'neoliberal consensus'
that today prevails in Latin America" as including "three main elements:
macroeconomic stability (smaller fiscal deficits), a diminished government role in the
economy (privatisation, deregulation) and greater openness to the outside (free trade
and an 'open' approach to foreign capital)." MARio ESTEBAN CARRANZA, SOUTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA OR FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS? OPEN
REGONALISM AND THE FUTURE OF REioNAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTH
AMERICA 50 (The Political Economy of Latin America Series, 2000). While Barshefsky
emphasizes ideological agreement as a matter of "principle," Carranza criticizes U.S.
management of the debt crisis of the 1980s, questions whether the economic
difficulties faced by Latin America really resulted from import substitution policies
and excessive reliance on debt, and argues that Latin American countries were
largely pressured into adopting market reforms by the United States and
development banks. See id. at 52-58. Any such "neoliberal consensus" may falter in
the wake of Argentina's economic crisis. See infra text accompanying notes 275-297.
8. See generally Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Kotschwar, The Future of Regional
Trading Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere (Sept. 11-12, 1998) (paper for the
Michigan State University 10 th Anniversary Conference, The U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, http://www.iie.com/papers/hufbauer0998.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
Hufbauer and Kotschwar explain that
Itihe aim of ISI [import substitution industrialization] was to
buffer Latin America from worsening terms of trade following the
commodity boom sparked by the Second World War. By erecting
high walls against manufactured imports, countries would develop
their own industries and reduce their dependency on the advanced
countries in general and the United States in particular.
Id. at "Latin America: A Clouded Past."
9. Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, Free Trade and the Hemispheric Hope,
Remarks at the Council of the Americas (May 7, 2001), at 1, http/www.ustr.gov/
speech-testIzoellick/zoellick_- 2.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
10. See Alan C. Swan, The Dynamics of Economic Integration in the Western
Hemisphere: The Challenge to America, 31 U. Mri INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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product ("GDP") for the United States in 2000 came to approxi-
mately US$9.9 trillion, amounting to nearly four-fifths of total
GDP for the entire Western Hemisphere." This figure is over
fourteen times that for Canada, the hemisphere's next largest
economy, and nearly seventeen times that for Brazil, the largest
economy in Latin America. 2 There are also significant disparities
across the hemisphere in terms of population and land area, 3 pro-
viding a further reflection of the vastly disproportionate resources
available to the negotiating parties. Because of such factors,
smaller nations in the hemisphere tend to have "problems of
scale" and a narrower scope of production, leaving them more
dependent on foreign trade than larger nations like the United
States. 4 This only tends to increase the economic stakes of the
FTAA for Latin America, especially considering the extent to
which some of the smaller nations in the hemisphere rely on tar-
iffs for revenue."5 At the same time, however, the FTAA is also of
11. World Bank, Total GDP 2000, http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/
GDP.pdf (last updated July 16, 2001) (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). GDP "is the sum of
the gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products." See World Bank,
2001 World Development Indicators, tbl. 4.1, at 197, http://www.worldbank.org/data/
wdi2001Jpdfs/tab4_l.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
12. World Bank, supra note 11.
13. Frank J. Garcia, The Integration of Smaller Economies into the FTAA, NAFrA:
L. AND Bus. REV. OF THE AMERICAS, Spring 1999, at 221, 231. "In terms of population,
of the thirty-four summit countries, nine account for nearly ninety percent of the
hemisphere's population. In terms of land area, the five largest countries account for
over eight-two percent of the hemisphere's land territory, and the ten largest account
for over ninety-five percent." Id. (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 226. Smaller nations in the hemisphere have also been hurt by the
"shift in international aid priorities" away from development and towards security
that has occurred since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001. Guyana's Jagdeo Urges Solidarity Among Caricom Nations, BBC MONITORING
SERVICE, Jan. 2, 2002, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=
020102002002 (last visited Jan. 26, 2002) (source: Caribbean Media Corporation, Jan.
1, 2002). An alignment of negotiating positions may be pursued by Caribbean and
Central American nations to ensure their needs are accounted for in the FTAA
process. Canute James, Caribbean Leaders In Push For New Trade Pact, Feb. 6,
2002, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.htm?id=020206001972 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2002).
15. See, e.g., Jamaican Minister Makes Case for Caricom's Smaller Economies in
FTAA, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=010419010625 (last visited Sept. 7, 2001) (text of report
by Johnson John Rose carried by Cana, Apr. 19, 2001); St Kitts and Nevis's Premier to
Talk at Summit on Special Needs of Small States, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Apr. 21,
2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010421001914 (last
visited Sept. 10, 2001) (source: Cana, Apr. 20, 2001) (St. Kitts and Nevis Prime
Minister Dr. Denzil Douglas observing that "'a large percentage of our revenue is
specifically based on tariffs,'" and that "'if we are to integrate with the rest of the
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great importance to the United States, given that the Western
Hemisphere is a large and growing market.16 Zoellick further
points out that the United States, as of February 2002, was a
member of only three of the 130 free trade agreements in force
around the world, and that as a result, "U.S. businesses are losing
marketshare.""7 Barshefsky has additionally suggested that the
"FTAA can help us reach trade goals outside the hemisphere,"
allowing the United States to approach future World Trade
Organization ("WTO")' negotiations bolstered by "a more cohesive
Western Hemisphere position."" While the Ministers negotiating
the FTAA ("Trade Ministers") have expressed assurance that it
will "be fully consistent" with the WTO and "not raise barriers to
other countries,"2" it is crucial to observe that it will extend beyond
the present scope of the WTO to include areas such as a common
investment regime, government procurement, and competition
policy. It is likely this expansion beyond the present scope of the
WTO regime that Barshefsky had in mind when she referred to
"trade goals outside the hemisphere," illuminating the FTAA's
broader significance.
This article examines the negotiation of the FTAA from a tac-
tical perspective. It seeks to discern what key negotiating nations
want out of such a free trade agreement, and the means through
hemisphere and the rest of the world, there must be special consideration given to our
peculiarities'").
16. Barshefsky, supra note 1, at 1.
17. Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick before the
Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate, Feb. 6, 2002, http://www.ustr.gov/speech-
test/zoellick/zoellick_14.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002). Zoellick also advances the
strategic argument that "[tiroubled neighbors export problems like illegal
immigration, environmental damage, crime, narcotics, and violence. . . . If the
Americas are strong, the United States will be better positioned to pursue its aims
around the world. But if our hemisphere is troubled, we will be preoccupied at home
and handicapped abroad." Zoellick, supra note 9, at 5.
18. The WTO represents "the common institutional framework for the conduct of
trade relations" among its members. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, art. II(1), THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONs 4 (1999); 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). As of January 1, 2002, 144 nations
were members of the WTO, including the United States and Brazil. See The
Organization: Members and Observers, http'//www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis_e/tif_eorg6_e.htm (WTO website) (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). The WTO
Agreement includes annexed agreements on trade in goods, services, and intellectual
property; dispute settlement; trade policy review; and certain plurilateral trade
agreements. WTO Agreement, supra, arts. II(2)-(3).
19. Barshefsky, supra note 1 at 7.
20. Denver Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, I 2.
21. See Overview of the FTAA Process, supra note 4.
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which they have sought to achieve their disparate goals. The
United States and Brazil, in particular, have employed complex
negotiating strategies in order to gain the upper hand - strategies
prompted by a variety of economic and political dynamics at
domestic and subregional levels. These dynamics include the sig-
nificant pressure exerted on U.S. policy-makers by constituent
groups sensitive to globalization's impact on labor and the envi-
ronment, as well as the challenge Brazil faces in maintaining a
stable subregional bloc through which to exert greater negotiating
leverage in the FTAA process. Consonant with insights of liberal
international relations theorists and multi-level game theorists, it
is observed that the FTAA negotiations are significantly con-
strained by political dynamics at multiple levels of organization,
and that these constraints will be major determining factors in the
outcome of the process. Ultimately, the article argues that while
potential gains from trade in the Western Hemisphere are of great
consequence, the FTAA's long-term significance lies more in its
precedential value for future trade negotiations at all levels - in
domestic, bilateral, regional, and multilateral fora. Throughout
the FTAA process, a number of voices in the United States, Brazil,
and other nations will be actively debating the meaning and
ramifications of "free trade," and thereby seeking to determine the
appropriate intersection of economics and politics for interna-
tional trade in this new Millennium.
I. NEGOTIATING STRUCTURE
The FTAA process has been aptly described as unfolding
along two "tracks," the first track involving "the process of devel-
oping and continually refining a negotiating mechanism," and the
second "focus[ing] on broadening and deepening hemispheric eco-
nomic integration by building on existing trade relationships and
encouraging the development of new arrangements."22 Unlike the
Uruguay Round negotiations for the WTO, which began "without
a negotiating mechanism or a well-defined agenda," the FTAA
approach has been to first establish a negotiating structure and to
set parameters for the agenda, and only then to negotiate the sub-
stance of the FTAA through that pre-defined structure.' The
Trade Ministers initially established a number of "working
groups," charged with the task of assembling data and making
22. Jarreau, supra note 1, at 58.
23. Id. at 59.
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recommendations on how to structure eventual negotiations, as
well as a "tripartite committee" comprised of the Organization of
American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean, "to provide analytical support, technical assistance,
and relevant studies within their respective areas of compe-
tence."25 The original working groups eventually became "negoti-
ating groups,"26 focusing on market access, investment, services,
government procurement, dispute settlement, agriculture, intel-
lectual property rights, subsidies, antidumping and counter-
vailing duties, and competition policy.
27
The work of these groups has fed into the series of "ministe-
rial meetings" at which the structure and parameters of negotia-
tion have been established, in turn punctuated by less frequent
"summits" of the heads of state of the negotiating nations. 8 As of
the Third Trade Ministerial Meeting in Belo Horizonte, Brazil,
several principles had been established to guide the negotiations:
a. Consensus constitutes the fundamental principle of deci-
sion making in the FTAA process ... ;
b. The outcome of the negotiations . . .will constitute a
comprehensive single undertaking... ;
c. The FTAA will be consistent with the WTO agreements;
d. Countries may negotiate... individually or as members
of a sub-regional integration group... ;
e. Special attention should be given to the needs, economic
conditions and opportunities of the smaller economies to
ensure their full participation in the FTAA process;
f. The need for establishing a temporary administrative
Secretariat to support the negotiations;
g. The year 2005 as the date for concluding negotiations, at
the latest.
29
The significance of these negotiating principles will be discussed
in detail below,30 but it should be observed here that the require-
ment of a "single undertaking," with no interim agreements, and
24. See generally Denver Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, at Annex I.
25. Id. T1 8.
26. Belo Horizonte Ministerial Declaration, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/
belo.e.asp, 91 11 (last visited Oct. 18, 2000) (requesting recommendations on "how the
Working Groups could be reconfigured into negotiating groups").
27. San Jose Ministerial Declaration, http-//www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/costa-
e.asp, I 11(last visited Oct. 18, 2000).
28. See Overview of the FTAA Process, supra note 4.
29. Belo Horizonte Ministerial Declaration, supra note 26, 5.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 133-143.
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the express endorsement of negotiation as part of "a sub-regional
integration group" reveal a fundamental tension between the
respective interests of Brazil and the United States. These two
negotiating principles are generally considered diplomatic victo-
ries for Brazil. The former tends to preserve flexibility for trade-
offs and prevents the United States from achieving incremental
liberalization of sensitive sectors through interim agreements,
while the latter ensures the ability of economically less powerful
nations to increase their negotiating leverage through the forma-
tion of blocs, thereby reducing the disparities described above.3
Further refinements to the negotiating structure at the
Fourth Trade Ministerial in San Jos6, Costa Rica, reflect anticipa-
tion of two major challenges for the negotiations. It was agreed in
San Jos6 that the Chairmanship and Vice-Chairmanship of the
FTAA would "rotate among different countries" throughout the
process.3" In the critical final stage of negotiations, however, the
FTAA will be co-chaired by Brazil and the United States.3 This
clearly reflects an expectation that the process will eventually
reduce itself to ensuring satisfaction of these two nations with the
final product.3 4 Another major challenge to successful completion
of the negotiations is reflected in the creation of a structure afford-
ing some measure of participation in the FTAA process for "civil
society" - effectively a term of art for non-governmental groups
impacted by trade:
We recognize and welcome the interests and concerns that
different sectors of society have expressed in relation to the
FTAA. Business and other sectors of production, labor,
environmental and academic groups have been particularly
31. See, e.g., CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 124; Jarreau, supra note 1, at 61, 63-64.
Notwithstanding the single undertaking requirement, however, the Trade Ministers
directed that certain "business facilitation measures" be adopted before completion of
the negotiations, in light of the "commitment to make concrete progress by the year
2000." San Jose Ministerial Declaration, supra note 27, 18. These measures
address areas such as dispute resolution, customs, and visa requirements. See
Business Facilitation, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ALCA-e.asp#busfac (last visited Jan.
2, 2001). Brazil argues that such measures violate the single undertaking
requirement while the United States argues that there is no inconsistency. See
Jarreau, supra note 1, at 61 n.36.
32. San Jose Ministerial Declaration, supra note 27, 12.
33. Id. The final stage of negotiation covers the period from November 1, 2002
through December 31, 2004, but the San Jose Ministerial Declaration makes clear
that the period of co-Chairmanship will last "until the conclusion of the negotiation,"
suggesting that negotiation could continue indefinitely notwithstanding the goal of
completion by 2005. Id.
34. See Jarreau, supra note 1, at 65-66.
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active in this matter .... We have, therefore, established a
committee of government representatives, open to all mem-
ber countries, who shall select a chair. The committee shall
receive these inputs, analyze them and present the range of
views for our consideration. 5
While this signals recognition of the demands of various interest
groups that their viewpoints be heard, labor and environmental
constituencies in particular have questioned the extent to which
such a committee allows for substantial participation of "civil soci-
ety" in the negotiations.36 As discussed below, it will likely prove
politically crucial for U.S. trade negotiators to ensure that the
views of these constituencies are adequately addressed in the
FTAA 7 Indeed, the "civil society" mechanism itself reflects con-
cern that domestic debate over such issues could threaten the
legitimacy of the outcome, or even paralyze the process alto-
gether." As Barshefsky has observed,
the public - in the United States and elsewhere - clearly
expects trade policy to respond more effectively then it has
in the past to the concerns of ordinary citizens .... That
means our FTAA negotiations must pay appropriate atten-
tion to the views of business, labor, consumer groups, envi-
ronmentalists, and others. Just as important, we must
promote openness and citizen contribution if the results are
to be credible.39
It is thus with the anticipation of public scrutiny that the
Trade Ministers were directed, at the Second Summit of the
Americas in Santiago, Chile, to begin negotiation of the substance
35. San Jose Ministerial Declaration, supra note 27, 17.
36. See, e.g., Statement of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) to the Committee of
Governmental Representatives on Civil Society Participation: Executive Summary
(Apr. 14, 1999), http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/ftaa/ftaa-soc_- 68.pdf
[hereinafter UAW Statement] (last visited Mar. 8, 2001) ("We believe this Committee
is a thoroughly inadequate mechanism for incorporating the views of working people
into the FTAA process or addressing the UAW's concerns regarding the FTAA model
of trade liberalization and regional economic integration.").
37. See infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
38. Efforts to disrupt the negotiation process through protest at the Third Summit
of the Americas, scheduled to take place in Quebec City, Canada, in April 2001, began
far in advance via the internet. See, e.g., WTO Action, Stop the Summit of the
Americas!, http://wtoaction.org/ftaa.phtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2000) ("In the spirit of
Seattle, and the anti-IMF/WB demonstrations in Washington .... we've started to
organize to make sure the Summit is effectively short-circuited. We want to go
beyond symbolic protest or reformism to making sure the Summit of the Americas is
shut down.").
39. Barshefsky, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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of the FTAA within the framework established in the prior Trade
Ministerials. 4' At the Fifth Trade Ministerial Meeting in Toronto,
Canada, the Trade Ministers instructed the Negotiating Groups to
"prepare a draft text of their respective chapters" of the FTAA for
consideration at the April 2001 Ministerial meeting." By January
2001, the Negotiating Groups had completed a bracketed draft
text "available for review by cleared advisors, including all Mem-
bers of Congress."42 Summaries of U.S. negotiating positions, dis-
cussed below, were made available through the USTR website,43
but the draft text itself was not made available for public review
or comment at that time." At the Sixth Trade Ministerial in Bue-
nos Aires, Argentina, however, the Trade Ministers "agreed to
publicize the draft FTAA Agreement in the four official languages,
after the third Summit of the Americas," believing it would "allevi-
ate considerably public concerns about the FTAA" and "establish
new standards of transparency in trade negotiations."4" The
Trade Ministers also decided that market access negotiations
should begin by May 15, 2002, and set out a series of instructions
for the Negotiating Groups.46 Significantly, these instructions
recognize the "general principle that any delegation has the right
to present the text proposals it deems relevant," but add that
"[m]ost Ministers recognize that the issues on environment and
labour should not be utilized as conditionalities nor subject to dis-
ciplines, the non compliance of which can be subject to trade
40. See Second Summit of the Americas: Santiago Declaration, http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/ministerials/chile.e.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2000).
41. Toronto Ministerial Declaration, 1I 8-9, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials
minise.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2000).
42. FTAA Negotiating Groups Meet Ministerial Challenge; USTR Releases Public
Summaries of U.S. Positions, Jan. 17, 2001 (Press Release, Office of the USTR), http:ll
www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/01/O1-06.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
43. See notes 111, 251; text accompanying notes 117, 249-251; see generally Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere
ftaa.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
44. Social and labor organizations pointed to this fact as evidencing a lack of true
transparency in the FTAA process, and called for release of draft texts for public
review. See Statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth,
Before the Senate Finance Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade, Oct. 5,
2000, http://www.senate.gov/-finance/blackwel.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2001); Liberal
Government Urged to Support Transparency in Current Negotiations for Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), CANADA NEwsWiRE, Nov. 7, 2000, available at LEXIS,
News Group File.
45. Buenos Aires Ministerial Declaration, 23, http'I/www.ftaa-alca.org/
ministerials/Bamine.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2001).
46. Id. 11. Specific instructions for the Market Access, Agriculture, Investment,
Services, and Government Procurement groups aim at initiating negotiations by May
15, 2002. See id. at Annex I, IT (A)1, (B)1, (C)1, (F)1, (G)(2).
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restrictions or sanctions."47 It is worth noting that in endeavoring
to preempt such debate, the statement clearly anticipates it.
The Third Summit of the Americas took place the weekend of
April 20-22, 2001 amidst the "most elaborate internal security
operation in Canadian history," including miles of chain link
fence, a jail "cleared in case of mass arrests," and the deployment
of thousands of police officers." The protests themselves are dis-
cussed below, but for present purposes it suffices to note that
while they did manage to disrupt and distract to some degree, the
Summit nevertheless proceeded to its conclusion.4 9 The assembled
heads of state issued a declaration, including an anticipated
"democracy clause":
We acknowledge that the values and practices of democracy
are fundamental to the advancement of all our objec-
tives .... Consequently, any unconstitutional alteration or
interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemi-
sphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the par-
ticipation of that state's government in the Summit of the
Americas process.5"
This effectively formalizes Cuba's exclusion from the FTAA pro-
cess, and while at least some Caribbean nations have opposed
this, the United States' answer has been that Cuba "'excluded'
itself from the process by its lack of democratic governance." 1 The
47. Id. at Annex I, 1.
48. Ken Warn, Quebec Braced to Repel New Invaders: The Forthcoming Summit of
the Americas Prompts the Most Elaborate Security Operation in Canadian History,
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=
010410001329 (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 100-104.
50. Third Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Quebec City, http://www.
sice.oas.org/ftaa/quebec/declara e.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
51. Caribbean and USA Differ at Meeting in Barbados on Cuba in FTAA Process,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 10, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File
(source: Cana, Mar. 9, 2001). The Quebec Summit prompted a May Day speech by
Fidel Castro dedicated almost entirely to depicting the FTAA as a U.S. effort "not to
isolate Cuba but to liquidate sovereignty, prevent integration, devour resources and
frustrate the destiny of a group of nations that, not including the English-speaking
countries, comprises more than 500m inhabitants who speak a Latin language and
share the same culture and history." Cuba: Castro's May Day Speech Rejects US
Trade "Annexation" BBC MONITORING SERVICE, May 6, 2001, http://global
archive.ft.con/globalarchive/article.html?id=010506001970 (last visited Sept. 10,
2001) (source: Cubavision TV, May 2, 2001, in Spanish) (excerpting Castro's May Day
speech). Should the FTAA come to pass, Castro foresees U.S. domination of
agriculture, profitable service industries, intellectual property and technology, the
dollar as the hemispheric currency, and the relegation of Latin America "to play the
part of supplier of raw materials and workers," all leading "inexorably to the
annexation of Latin America by the United States." Id.
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declaration also confirms eventual public release of the draft text,
and that negotiations are to be completed in time for the FTAA to
enter into force "no later than December 2005. "52
The long-awaited draft text was finally released on July 3,
2001, several months later than initially expected." In general,
the draft text confirms what was largely expected of the basic
architecture of the FTAA, providing for some degree of national
treatment and tariff reduction for agriculture and goods;54 rules on
safeguards, origin, customs procedures, and technical barriers to
trade;55 some degree of national treatment and most favored
At the same time, however, Cuban opposition parties have pushed for Cuban
involvement in the FTAA, arguing that "'[olur people will only progress towards
sustainable development through a concerted effort, unity and intelligent negotiation,
and not by demonizing proposals which, like the FTAA, are headed in the direction of
freedom of trade in our region.'" Moderate Cuban Opposition Parties Express Support
For FTAA, BBC MOITORmNG SERVICE, Nov. 24, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=011124001760 (last visited Dec. 2, 2001) (source:
Notimex, Nov. 23, 2001, in Spanish).
The democracy clause has also raised questions as to "whether Haiti met the
grouping's democratic criteria after two elections marred by irregularities." Edward
Alden & Guy de Jonquieres, Summit Gives a Rich Study of Contrasts Not Unity:
Heads of the 34 Countries May Struggle to Maintain the Public Veneer of Solidarity,
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, http:/globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchivearticle.html?id=
010423000683 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
52. Declaration of Quebec City, supra note 50; Third Summit of the Americas:
Plan of Action, sec. 6, paras. 1-2, http://www.sice.org/ftaa/quebec/plan2-e.asp (last
visited Sept. 13, 2001). Venezuela was the only nation to reserve its position on any
part of the text. President Hugo Chavez objected to the phrase "representative
democracy," a system that he blames for decades of plundering by elected officials in
Venezuela, as well as to the time frame for negotiations. In Venezuela, FTAA
ratification will be subject to referendum, leading Chavez to question whether his or
any nation can guarantee ratification by a specific date. Jesus Maria Alonso,
Venezuela Has Reservations on Declaration's "Democracy Clause", EFE NEWS
SERVICE, Apr. 22, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=
010422002208 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001); A Cautious Yes to Pan-American Trade,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2001, at 35.
53. While the delay has been explained as resulting from the process of
translation and approval, critics have questioned whether "the timing was designed
to distract attention from its contents." The draft appeared a day before the
Independence Day holiday, "'in the middle of the summer when no one would be
watching.'" Nancy Dunne, Critics Attack Timing of Americas Free Trade Draft, FIN.
TIMES, July 4, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchivearticle.html?id=
010704001597 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
54. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Agriculture, sec. 2, arts. 3-4, July 3, 2001, http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept.
17, 2001); FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Market Access: Annex: [Chapter on] Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures, arts. 2-4, July
3, 2001, http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2001).
55. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Market Access: Annex: [Chapter on] Safeguard Measures, [Chapter on] Origin
Regime, [Chapter on] Customs Procedures, [Chapter on] [Customs] Procedures
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nation treatment for government procurement, investment, ser-
vices, and intellectual property protection;" rules on the use of
subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing duties laws;57 a dis-
pute settlement mechanism;58 and the extension of competition
law throughout the hemisphere." The 434 page draft text
remains almost entirely in brackets, with numerous variants
included on many important provisions, leaving opponents and
proponents alike unsure what to make of it."0 Indeed, while non-
governmental organizations have long demanded its release in the
interest of transparency,6 and while Zoellick has described it as
"'an unprecedented effort to make international trade and its eco-
nomic and social benefits more understandable to the public,"'62
there is really quite little to glean from the document beyond a few
crucial points. First, environmental and labor concerns remain
almost entirely unaddressed." This will likely fuel criticism by
Related to Rules of Origin, [Chapter on] Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade,
July 3, 2001, http'//www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2001).
56. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Government Procurement, art. 3, July 3, 2001, http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited
Sept. 17, 2001); FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter
on Investment, arts. 2-3, July 3, 2001, http:/www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept. 17,
2001); FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Services, arts. 3, 6, July 3, 2001, http:/www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2001);
FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on Intellectual
Property Rights, pp. 8.4-8.5, July 3, 2001, http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept.
17, 2001).
57. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Subsidies, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, July 3, 2001, httpi/www.ftaa-
alca.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2001).
58. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Dispute Settlement, July 3, 2001, http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept. 17,
2001).
59. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas: Draft Agreement: Chapter on
Competition Policy, July 3, 2001, http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited Sept. 17,
2001).
60. John Cavanagh, director of the Institute for Policy Studies and an opponent of
the FTAA, notes the extensive bracketing and likens the draft text to "'reading a
detective novel.'" Tim Shorrock, Americas: Free-Trade Draft Exposes Rifts,
Opportunities for Critics, INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 6, 2001, http://www.
corpwatch.org/news/PND.jsp?articleid=65 (last visited Mar. 31, 2002). Jerry Haar,
senior research associate at Dante B. Fascell North-South Center and a proponent of
the FTAA, likens the draft text to "'a letter from a Soviet citizen to a relative in the
West that had to go through the censors at the time of the Cold War,'" and concludes,
"I see them light years away from reaching any kind of agreement, given all the
bracketed text.'" Jane Bussey, Nations Divided on Free Trade Draft, MIAMi HERALD,
July 14, 2001, at 1C.
61. See supra note 44.
62. Dunne, supra note 53.
63. The Chapter on Investment does include brief articles on labor and the
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non-governmental organizations" and entrench democratic oppo-
sition in Congress," heightening the pitch of domestic debate in
the United States. Second, the toughest negotiations on liberali-
zation appear to lie ahead.66 For example, the Chapter on Agricul-
ture predictably aims at national treatment and tariff reduction,
yet includes the following provision:
[4.2.3.1. The Parties do not acquire tariff commitments on
products included in Annex . .I
The scope of this single provision may effectively determine the
environment, but they direct only that nations "strive" to make sure they do not
"waive or otherwise derogate from . . . such laws as encouragement for the
establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention of an investment." Chapter on
Investment, supra note 56, Arts. 18-19. This has done little to assuage fears, or blunt
criticisms, regarding the rest of the investment chapter. The investment chapter
actually leaked to the public in April 2001, months before the rest of the draft text,
giving rise to immediate concern over its resemblance to Chapter 11 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). See Gumisai Mutume, Finance: FTAA
Investment Chapter Confirms Worst Fears of Civil Society, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr.
19, 2001, http://www.oneworld.orgips2/aprOl/00-56 003.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2001); Leaked FTAA Investment Chapter Cause for Concern, ENVT NEWS SERVICE,
Apr. 20, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. Among other things, NAFTA's
Chapter 11 states that "[no Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or
expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party," and permits an investor
to pursue a claim against an allegedly breaching nation to enforce this provision.
Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, arts. 1110, 1116, 32 ILM 289 (1993); see also http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org
English/index.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2002) [hereinafter NAFTA]. One critic calls
this "'the most pernicious element of the entire free trade edifice,'" given its use "to
challenge laws and regulations designed to protect the environment, health and
safety measures." Mutume, supra. It appears that the FTAA investment chapter will
essentially replicate these provisions. See Chapter on Investment, supra note 56,
arts. 10(1) (in four variants), 15(3).
64. According to Public Citizen's Lori Wallach, "'[tihis one-time public relations
stunt will not deceive the broad-based civil society opposition to negotiating a trade
agreement, which is being drawn up at the behest of special interests who flatly
refuse to address the concerns of environmentalists, labor organizations or consumers
when they negotiate secret agreements.'" Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, FTAA
"Draft" Text Made Public Today Is Missing Vital Information; Has Been Released Too
Late, July 3, 2001, http://www.citizen.orgpressroom/release.cfm?ID=169 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2002). Wallach also questions how a bracketed draft text for such an
agreement could come to only 434 pages while the final version of NAFTA is over 700
pages, charging that the draft has been "'sanitized by eliminating vital information.'"
Id.
65. Congressman Lloyd Doggett, for example, "attacked the draft," charging the
Bush administration with showing "'only minimal interest in addressing either the
impact of trade on environmental and labour standards or in assuring a reasonable
level of transparency and public participation in trade decision-making.'" Dunne,
supra note 53.
66. Recall the Trade Minister's decision that detailed market access negotiations
should begin by May 15, 2002. See supra text accompanying note 46.
67. Chapter on Agriculture, supra note 54, art. 4.2.3.1.
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scope of liberalization for the entire chapter on agriculture, and its
negotiation will likely prove central to the FTAA, given the impor-
tance Brazil attaches to U.S. market access for its agricultural
products." Finally, it should also be observed that while no vari-
ants in the actual text are attributed to particular nations, one of
only two attributions made in the entire document comes in the
form of an annexed issue "for further discussion" raised by
MERCOSUR, a customs union including Argentina, Brazil, Para-
guay, and Uruguay, 9 as if to make utterly clear that Brazil will
encounter the negotiations bolstered by a unified bloc rather than
alone."0
This overview of the basic negotiating structure and progress
to date, though cursory, is sufficient to highlight those variables
most crucial to the outcome of the FTAA process:
" The centrality of the United States and Brazil in the
negotiations, and the recognition that completion of the
negotiations will largely come down to reconciling their
competing demands;
" The demands of various sectors of "civil society" to be
heard and to have their views incorporated into the final
negotiated text, and the particular challenge for the
United States and Canada to forge a deal acceptable to
domestic constituencies skeptical of globalization's
impact on labor and the environment; and
* The desire of many nations to negotiate together as
blocs, and the particular challenge for Brazil to forge a
coalition substantial and stable enough to stand up
against the United States.
How the FTAA process will come out - whether it will succeed,
and if so, what the final product will look like - will depend largely
68. See infra text accompanying notes 110-121.
69. See generally Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing a
Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991) (the "Treaty of Asuncion").
70. "Mercosur considers that the FTAA's future chapter on services should contain
specific disciplines related to eliminating and prohibiting subsidies that have
distorting effects on the market or that cause shifts in normal trade flows." Chapter
on Services, supra note 56, at Annex 1, Disciplines on Subsidies. At the same time,
however, it must also be observed that the other named attribution is to Chile. See id.
at Annex 1, Quantitative Restrictions. While Chile is an associate member of
MERCOSUR, Brazil failed in its effort to strengthen the negotiating bloc through full
membership, due largely to the United States' effort to cement its own bilateral
relations with Chile. See infra text accompanying notes 192-203. Thus it is certainly
conceivable that MERCOSUR's attributed statement aims at conveying solidarity as
a negotiating bloc, while Chile's attributed statement aims at checking it by
conveying independence from MERCOSUR.
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on how these key states formulate their goals and manage these
challenges.
II. GOALS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES
Certainly, a primary motivation for the United States in pur-
suing hemispheric trade liberalization is the value of the Western
Hemisphere as a market for U.S. exports.7 But the current
appeal of regionalism for the United States also likely results, in
substantial part, from impatience with what it perceives to be the
relatively slow pace and narrow scope of multilateral trade liber-
alization under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")IWTO regime. Commentators have observed, beginning
in the early 1990s, a sense of "negotiating fatigue" on the part of
both the United States and Canada - an "increasing frustration
... over the slow pace of progress in the Uruguay Round, particu-
larly in the critical areas of agriculture, services, investment, and
intellectual property" - as well as "the corollary tactical desire,
particularly of the U.S., to signal to Japan and the EU that their
reluctance to engage in the Uruguay Round negotiations seriously
would lead to discriminatory regional alternatives to trade and
investment liberalization."72 That this sense of "fatigue" with
WTO-level negotiations motivates the U.S. approach to the FTAA
is particularly apparent in Barshefsky's comment that this pro-
cess could ultimately help the United States achieve its goal of
broader liberalization globally.7 Essentially the idea is to achieve
the desired degree of liberalization at a more modest level (if hem-
ispheric free trade may be termed "modest"), and then to use that
as a foundation for a similar agreement at the global level." This
is, in fact, a common U.S. trade negotiating technique:
[Tihe foreign economic policy of the United States is deter-
71. See text accompanying note 16.
72. Pierre Sauve, Canada, Free Trade, and the Diminishing Returns of
Hemispheric Regionalism, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AF. 237, 240 (1999); see
also David Palmeter, Some Inherent Problems with Free Trade Agreements, 27 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 991, 991 (1996) (arguing that one explanation "for the move toward
preferential arrangements is the 'GATT-frustration' factor.... Since multilateralism
was hostage to the lowest common denominator, the argument went, countries
interested in freer trade should move ahead bilaterally, letting the laggards catch up
if they could").
73. See text accompanying notes 18-19.
74. Manuela Tortora, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: A Latin American
Perspective on Future Prospects, 5 NAFTA: L. AND Bus. REV. OF THE AMERICAS 261,
263 (1999).
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mined first by objectives defined in terms of economic topics
and, second, in terms of partners or economic fora....
By defining ab initio its global objectives in terms of issues
rather than fora, the United States derives a double advan-
tage. On the one hand, it achieves coherence in its foreign
policy (at least in the economic arena). On the other hand,
it is able to proceed "in a spiral." In other words, Washing-
ton presents a specific position in a bilateral or multilateral
forum. Once it achieves its goals at the forum, it proposes
them as the "floor" for the next negotiations, and so on.75
In this sense the United States is already looking further down
the road - beyond the FTAA and the intrinsic value of the West-
ern Hemisphere as an export market - to the FTAA's anticipated
precedential value in future global trade negotiations.
While U.S. trade policy-makers have enthusiastically pursued
the FTAA, 6 various domestic constituencies have begun to scruti-
nize their actions closely, and the effects of trade liberalization on
labor and the environment have become increasingly contentious
political issues in the United States over recent years. The ques-
tion of whether labor and environmental issues are "sufficiently
trade-related to warrant consideration" remains an open one.
Some argue that "trade is trade and social issues are social issues,
and the latter should never be allowed to interfere with the purity
of the former." Others contend that "the line between trade
related and not trade-related is determined by what influences the
competitive position of products on international markets," a stan-
dard under which "both labor and environmental issues are suffi-
ciently trade-related to warrant consideration."77 The intensity of
75. Id. at 266-67.
76. The Clinton administration identified the FTAA as one of its "top trade
expansion priorities for 2000." See Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities
Pursuant to Executive Order 13116, Apr. 30, 2000, pt. I, http://www.ustr.gov/pdf
report.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001). President Bush has made "Trade Promotion
Authority," formerly known as "fast track," his top trade priority, with an eye toward
facilitating the FTAA negotiation and other trade negotiations. See 2001
International Trade Agenda, at 2-4, http://www.ustr.gov/agenda.pdf (last visited Sept.
21, 2001); see also infra text accompanying notes 80-85.
77. Robert F. Housman, The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in
Future Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization Efforts, 10 Co~N. J. INT'L L. at 301,
315-16 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Trade in the Americas: Progress,
Challenges, and Prospects: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade, 106th Cong., 20-21 (1999) (statement of Philip Stephen
Lande) (observing that one side "views the issue of the linkage between trade and
labor and environment one way - i.e., that trade perhaps is the best way to have
economic growth and through economic growth you perhaps solve some of these
2002]
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this debate resulted in President Clinton's loss of "fast-track"
authorization, under which Congress had previously granted the
President authority to undertake trade negotiations subject only
to limited committee review78 and a yes-or-no vote in Congress,
without the possibility of amendment.79 Following establishment
of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), 0 which
addresses labor and environmental issues in side agreements,8
the Clinton administration's attempt to renew fast-track author-
ity encountered a divided Congress; congressional Republicans
and business constituencies opposed granting Clinton fast-track
authority because it would have allowed him to negotiate "trade-
related aspects of both labor and environmental issues," while
congressional Democrats and labor, environmental, and human
rights constituencies "were unwilling to see a retreat from even
the labor provisions that the [first] Bush administration had
placed in prior fast-tracks." 2 Fast-track authority was lost and
subsequent attempts by the Clinton administration to regain it
failed. 3 Although U.S. policy-makers in favor of hemispheric
trade liberalization have nevertheless achieved some successes
without it, 4 it is widely recognized that the absence of fast-track
authority compromises the United States' credibility (and there-
fore leverage) in international trade negotiations.85 Simply put,
many nations are reluctant to negotiate a deal with the President
problems, and the other side believes that there is a linkage where you really have to
have economic sanctions and use trade as your major instrument as a way to convince
countries to have acceptable labor and environmental rights").
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e) (1994). "Fast track" negotiating authority was originally
granted to the President through the Trade Act of 1974 as a solution to the problem of
non-tariff barriers abroad. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1994); Guerra, supra note 3,
at 172.
79. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (1994).
80. The United States, Canada, and Mexico established NAFTA on December 17,
1992, with the objectives, among other things, of achieving free trade in goods and
services, and "establish[ing] a framework for further trilateral, regional and
multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement."
NAFTA, supra note 63, art. 102.
81. See Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Labor
Agreement]; see also httpJ/www.naalc.orgenglishlinfocentre/NAALC.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2002); Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA Environmental Agreement]; see also httpJ/www.cec.org/pubs info-resources/
lawtreat-agree/naaec/index.cfin?varlan=english (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
82. Housman, supra note 77, at 311-13; see also Guerra, supra note 3, at 173-74.
83. Guerra, supra note 3, at 174.
84. See Housman, supra note 77, at 314.
85. See, e.g., Guerra, supra note 3.
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only to have Congress amend it, putting a very expensive process
back to square one. 6 It is thus not surprising that Zoellick
stressed the importance of renewed fast-track authority in his
Senate confirmation hearings,"v or that President Bush has made
it his top trade priority under the name "trade promotion author-
ity.""8 As of the Quebec Summit, the European Union ("EU"),
which grants its trade commissioner such authority, had "signed
20 substantial pacts since 1990, and [had] 15 more on the way;
over the same period the United States [had] ratified only two,
with four more in the works." 9 The impact of the loss of fast track
on the FTAA process, and particularly the opportunities it has
opened up for Brazil, are discussed further below."0
This congressional impasse over fast track is indicative of the
mixed feelings of the U.S. public regarding the relationship of
trade to labor and environmental issues,91 but over recent years it
has become increasingly apparent that a trade deal of the magni-
tude of the FTAA has little chance of achieving substantial legiti-
macy in the United States without addressing these issues in
some way. Barshefsky has stated that "the public - in the United
States and elsewhere - clearly expects trade policy to respond
more effectively than it has in the past to the concerns of ordinary
citizens," and that this requires "appropriate attention to the
views of business, labor, consumer groups, environmentalists, and
others,"9 2 presumably referring to the FTAA's structure for "civil
86. See, e.g., Guerra, supra note 3, at 177; Jarreau, supra note 1, at 75.
87. See Abid Aslam, Trade: New U.S. Trade Representative Faces Obstacles, INTER
PRESS SERVCE, Feb. 6, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. Toward this goal,
Zoellick even suggested changing the term "fast track" to "the relatively innocuous
'trade promotion authority'" to avoid the connotation of insufficient congressional
oversight, much like the replacement ofn"most favored nation status" with "permanent
normal trading relations" by those supporting stronger trade relations with China.
Id.
88. See supra note 76.
89. All In the Familia, supra note 3, at 22.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 133-143.
91. One poll found that while the majority of Americans support increased
international trade, "Americans are lukewarm about the actual net benefits of trade
for most sectors of society, except for the business community." Program on
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), Americans on Globalization: A Study of US
Public Attitudes, Mar. 28, 2000, at pt. 2, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/
Globalization/2.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2000). A "strong majority" felt that "trade
has not grown in a way that adequately incorporates concerns for American workers,
international labor standards and the environment. Support for fast track is low,
apparently because it signifies the increase of trade without incorporating these
concerns." Id.
92. Barshefsky, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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society" input. While President Bush strongly supports the FTAA
and has renewed efforts to regain fast track,w Barshefsky believes
that major trade agreements like the FTAA cannot be expected to
make it through Congress without the inclusion of protections for
93. See Anthony Boadle, Bush Would Revive Free Trade in the Americas - Aide,
REUTERS, July 20, 2000, http://europe.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/20/
campaign.bush.latam.reut/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2000); Peter Morton, Republican
U.S. President Would Ease Trade, Leaders Say: Canadian Viewpoint: Split Congress
Seen as Obstacle to New Initiatives, NAfL POST, Nov. 18, 2000, at D06.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, did not diminish the Bush administration's
pursuit of fast track authority. On September 20, 2001, the Washington Post
published a controversial Op-Ed piece by USTR Zoellick, arguing that in response to
the attacks, "Congress now needs to send an unmistakable signal to the world that
the United States is committed to global leadership," particularly by granting fast
track authority. Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror With Trade, WASH. POST, Sept.
20, 2001, at A35. Senator Ernest Hollings, among others, subsequently criticized the
article as "an unfortunate effort to take partisan advantage of a national tragedy."
Ernest F. Hollings, No Trade War, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2001, at A26; see also Juliet
Eilperin, Bipartisan Approach Faces Tests: As Congress Tackles Tough Issues,
Leadership is Questioned, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2001, at A04 (reporting that
Representative Robert Matsui "was particularly offended by a speech that.. . Zoellick
delivered Monday [September 23, 2001] at the Institute for International Economics,
in which he suggested trade was integral to the war against terrorism"). Such
criticism led Zoellick to respond "'I have never said, and do not feel now, that this is a
litmus test of patriotism.'" Id.
As of this writing, the House of Representatives has passed a trade promotion
authority bill by a single vote (215-214), with the support of 194 Republicans and 21
Democrats. Last minute maneuvering included an agreement by House Republican
leaders that "any trade bill coming back to the House would have to ensure Caribbean
and Andean garment imports would use fabric that was finished and dyed in the
United States". Juliet Eilperin, Trade Bill Passes House by One Vote: Bush Closer to
Obtaining More Negotiating Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2001, at A01. In addition,
House Republican leaders stated that the Bush administration would have to
"undertake special consultations with Congress before agreeing to consider tariff
reductions on hundreds of agricultural products considered import sensitive" to
garner the votes of Florida Republicans. Edward Alden, Trade Zone for Americas
"Threatened", FIN. TImEs, Dec. 13, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
Democrats generally opposed the bill "on the grounds that it lacked sufficient
environmental and labor protections," listing them as negotiating priorities but
including "nothing to ensure foreign countries will observe a minimum standard," and
opening the possibility of suits aimed at such standards in the United States. Id. The
bill's fate in the Democratic-controlled Senate remains uncertain. As of this writing,
a bill similar to the House bill has passed through the Senate Finance Committee (18-
3). Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick before the Committee on
Finance of the U.S. Senate, supra note 17. In a sense, however, the question of
whether fast track as currently conceived will pass through Congress is mooted by the
fact that its exceptions encompass the very goods of greatest consequence to many
hemispheric trading partners, including Brazil, rendering it ineffective as a show of
good faith negotiation. See, e.g., Alden, supra; Bush Calls on Democrats to Support
Fast-Track Trade Authority, EFE NEws SERVICE, Jan. 15, 2002, http://global
archive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020115008509 (last visited Mar. 15,
2002)." See also sources cited supra note 77.
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labor and the environment. 4 Senator Max Baucus, the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee, has likewise stated
that "they are plainly on the agenda," and "[t]hose who simply
ignore that reality-I think, are holding back the debate and they
are stalling progress."9 5
Various forms of response to the FTAA process by "civil soci-
ety" constituencies reflect significant misgivings about its impact
on labor and the environment, highlighting the particular chal-
lenges facing U.S. and Canadian policy-makers from within their
own borders. 6 A submission to the FTAA's Committee of Govern-
94. See James Cox, Trade Issues in "Good Shape" Barshefsky: Next President
Faces Major Challenges, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2000, at 3B. The New Democrat
Coalition, a group of "'nearly 90 centrist lawmakers in the House of Representatives
and the Senate,'" has said that while they ultimately support completion of the FTAA,
it likely would not make it through Congress if labor and environmental issues were
not addressed. New Democrats Say Bush Needs To Consider Labor, Environment in
Trade Deals, BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, Jan. 4, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Group File.
95. Globalization and American Trade Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on
Finance: United States Senate, 1 0 7th Cong., 5 (2001) (statement of Senator Max
Baucus).
96. While the role of these groups in domestic politics is particularly significant in
the United States and Canada, it is important to recognize the global nature of the
movements they represent. See, e.g., World Poor In Sale of the 21' Century:
Democratic Rights Are a High Price to Pay for Western Free Trade, GUARDIAN, Apr. 6,
2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010406000661 (last
visited Sept. 7, 2001) (observing that some countries are "presented as diverse,
complicated political landscapes where citizens have a range of divergent views,"
while others "seem to speak on the world stage in an ideological monotone," and that
"such diversity of public opinion is rarely attributed to citizens of third world
countries"). In Argentina, for example, the "Mobilization Committee Against the
FTAA Free Trade Agreement," which includes a number of trade unions and non-
governmental organizations, planned its own demonstrations to oppose the FTAA.
Argentine Unions Join Mass Mobilization Calling for Referendum on FTAA, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Feb. 28, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File
(source: Telam, Feb. 27, 2001, in Spanish); see also Argentina: Anti-Globalization
Protests to Disrupt Regional Economic Talks, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 2,
2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source: Telam, Apr. 1, 2001, in Spanish);
Argentina: Protesters Clash With Police at Demonstration Against FTAA, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 7, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source:
Telam, Apr. 7, 2001, in Spanish); Ecuador: Environmental, Rights Activists Occupy
Canadian Embassy in Quito, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 22, 2001, available
at LEXIS, News Group File (source: Notimex, Apr. 20, 2001, in Spanish) (reporting
the occupation of Canada's embassy in Ecuador to protest the FTAA).
The "World Social Forum," held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, as a counter-gathering to
the "World Economic Forum" held in Davos, Switzerland, saw the convergence of
thousands of delegates from unions and non-governmental organizations around the
world dedicated to fighting globalization. See World Social Forum: Porto Alegre,
Brazil, http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/eng/2001.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2001);
Mario Osava, World Social Forum: Consensus Takes Shape as Forum Ends, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 30, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. The event's
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mental Representatives on Civil Society Participation ("Commit-
tee on Civil Society") by the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America ("UAW") expressed the opinion that such a committee is a
"thoroughly inadequate mechanism for incorporating the views of
working people into the FTAA process."97 The UAW further notes
that corporations have had "special access" to the Trade Ministers
through business fora, and that there are no negotiating groups
for labor and the environment." The submission expresses dissat-
isfaction with the protections afforded by the NAFTA "side agree-
ments," and registers support for treatment of these issues in the
text of the FTAA itself.99
Discontent with the impact of globalization generally, and the
prospect of the FTAA in particular, has also been expressed in
numerous organizing efforts, through the Internet and otherwise,
aimed at protesting and even stalling the FTAA negotiations.
Canadian social and labor organizations, in response to the Sum-
mit of the Americas held in Quebec City in April 2001, "'actively
prepar[ed] a counter-summit to the official gathering to put our
concerns firmly on the trade agenda.'"1"0 Indeed, such organiza-
prominence was underscored by a televised debate with participants at the Davos
meeting, including George Soros, who found himself "accused by one speaker of being
responsible for the deaths of children in poor countries - although he is one of the few
Davos participants to agree with some of their more concrete policy ideas." Geoff
Dyer, No Common Ground Over Globalisation: Transatlantic Televised Debate, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchivearticle.html?id=
010129000836 (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). Organizers of the event "promote
alternatives to the 'neoliberal' orthodoxy of free trade, free markets and privatisation:
a familiar wish-list, such as cancelling third-world debt, a worldwide tax on financial
transactions, workers' rights and more care for the environment in trade accords."
Globalisation Trashed in Brazil, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Group File. Paradoxically, some suggest that the Brazilian government "can use it as
evidence of the growing opposition in Brazil, and as leverage to eke more concessions
out of the US to help it sell globalisation to the Brazilian public." Lafer Will Oppose
Fast Track to FTAA; Brazil Seeks Trade Concessions From Bush, LATIN AM. WKLY.
REP., Jan. 30, 2001, at 51. See also infra note 119 (noting the party division within
Brazil regarding the FTAA, as enunciated at the 2002 World Social Forum).
97. UAW Statement, supra note 36.
98. Id.
99. Id. The U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement does in fact include labor and
environmental provisions in the text of the agreement itself. In substance they differ
little from the NAFTA side agreements, but their inclusion in the text itself does
signal more widespread focus among U.S. policy-makers on the interconnection of
trade with labor and environmental issues. See infra text accompanying notes 228-
237.
100. Liberal Government Urged to Support Transparency in Current Negotiations
for Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), supra note 44.
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tions used the Internet as a tool through which to organize an
"anti-capitalist convergence" aimed at halting the negotiations:
In the spirit of Seattle, and the anti-IMF/WB demonstra-
tions in Washington.. ., we've started to organize to make
sure the Summit is effectively short-circuited. We want to
go beyond symbolic protest or reformism to making sure
the Summit of the Americas is shut down. 1 1
The fast, cost-effective, and global nature of the Internet has made
it a valuable tool for organizing efforts of this sort,'0 ' and it can be
expected in the long term to impact the FTAA process as "civil
society" seeks to force concerns like labor and the environment
onto the agenda. The Quebec Summit itself was in no sense "shut
down," leading some to speculate as to whether a "law of diminish-
ing media returns" from protest to protest may be at work.0 3 The
protests did garner significant attention, however, with almost
30,000 people attending marches,"' maintaining the public's focus
on their issues and the perceived shortcomings of the FTAA
process.0 5
Ultimately, the perspectives expressed through official sub-
missions to the Committee on Civil Society, or through less formal
organizing efforts and protests, spring from a widespread skepti-
cism about the effects of globalization generally, and the expan-
sion of free trade in particular. Thus, U.S. policy-makers
101. WTO Action, Stop the Summit of the Americas!, http://wtoaction.org
ftaa.phtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2000); see also The Anti-Capitalist Convergence, http:/
/www.quebec200l.net/enintro.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
102. See generally, e.g., Jeffrey M. Ayres, From the Streets to the Internet: The
Cyber-Diffusion of Contention, 566 ANNALS Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 132 (1999)
(discussing the impact of internet-based protest efforts on the negotiation of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment).
103. See, e.g., Charlotte Denny, Free Trade Free-For-All: As Quebec Hosts the Third
Summit of the Americas, This Weekend, Divisions Within the Conference May
Overshadow the Protests Outside It, GUARDIAN, Apr. 20, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Group File.
104. See Jane Martinson, Street Fighting Flares as Police Crack Down: Anti-
Globalisation Protests in Quebec as 34 American Leaders Gather, OBSERVER, Apr. 22,
2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
105. Cf New Battle of Quebec: But the Protesters Are Missing the Point, GUARDLAN,
Apr. 21, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File ("The protests in Quebec are not
going to halt trade, let alone bring about the demise of global capitalism. What they
will do is help create space for those with constructive ideas on debt relief, the
environment, trade and global economic governance, to influence the world for the
better."); A Cautious Yes to Pan-American Trade, supra note 52 (observing that while
the FTAA effort "took a few more steps forward in Quebec," the Summit and
accompanying protests nevertheless "provided evidence of the difficulties in the path
of the FTAA").
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enthusiastic about the hemispheric expansion of free trade will
face opposition not only at the international negotiating table, but
also at the domestic level from constituencies questioning the dis-
tributional effects of increased free trade.
106
III. BRAZIL, MERCOSUR, AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNITY
As observed above, the U.S. market is vastly disproportionate
in size and scope to other individual markets in the Western
Hemisphere, and indeed to the rest of the hemisphere combined.' 7
Ultimately Brazil's leaders recognize the value of access to the
U.S. market for their exports, but fear a free trade deal in which
106. The UAW's submission to the Committee on Civil Society, for example,
emphasizes the distributional nature of the debate, arguing that the FTAA "will lead
to rapid shifts in production from one FTAA country to another, with serious
dislocation for workers," and that "NAFTA has demonstrated that U.S. workers can
lose their jobs as a result of increased imports from Mexico or other developing
countries due to decisions by multinational corporations to move their production or
to arrange for contractors to supply them from other countries." UAW Statement,
supra note 36. To the extent that a primary aim of the FTAA is the promotion of
prosperity and a higher living standard for workers hemispherically, "[tihe UAW
supports providing debt relief to countries in the region in order to make funds
available for stimulating domestic economic growth and for public investment in
infrastructure and progress in education, health and social welfare." Id. However,
others question this position. "The mainstream academic view actually is that
increased trade with developing countries may account for at most 20 per cent of the
reduction in the earnings of low-skilled American workers (relative to highly skilled
workers) but not much more." Dani Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization
Debate, FoREIGN POL'Y, June 22, 1997, at 19, 20.
Assessment of the distributional effects of free trade relates to the complex
theoretical debate over the effects of "regulatory competition." The fear is that
increasing ease of movement across national boundaries will allow corporations to
locate in the jurisdiction with the lowest levels of labor and environmental regulation,
creating a "race to the bottom" in which nations in need of foreign investment compete
by reducing levels of regulation, thereby reducing the costs of compliance with their
rules. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization,
and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. IN'L L. J. 47, 52 (1993). Law-and-economics scholars, on
the other hand, argue that regulatory competition is beneficial because corporate
managers will incorporate in the jurisdiction with the most efficient rules from the
shareholder's perspective. See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in
Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the
Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 423, 431 (1991)
(comparing various perspectives on regulatory competition). For good examinations of
this debate in varying contexts, see generally Trachtman, supra; Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The desirable Limits on State Competition
in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1992) (seeking to determine "the desirable
role of state competition in shaping corporate law" within the United States); Charny,
supra (examining the potential for a "race to the bottom" in the European
Communities and "outlin[ing] some basic principles for constructing a theory about
how to allocate corporate rulemaking responsibility among jurisdictional levels").
107. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
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market access secured is insufficient to counteract resulting
imports from the United States. 0s Brazil's most competitive
industries, including textiles, agriculture, steel, and ceramics,
would likely benefit from increased trade with the United
States." 9 Brazilian President Fernando Enrique Cardoso has
expressed frustration, however, with what Brazil considers non-
tariff barriers in the form of NAFTA quality and hygiene require-
ments that function to keep Brazilian goods out of the U.S. mar-
ket, and which are thought to have contributed to surpluses for
the United States in its trade with Brazil.1 ' Equally frustrating
have been the United States' continued protection of precisely
those sectors most important to Brazil, including textiles, steel,
and agriculture, 1 ' and its refusal to negotiate regarding its
108. See Lenilson, U.S. Congress Hampers Pan-American Trade Bloc, Cardoso
Says, JAPAN EcON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 14, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
109. See All In the Familia, supra note 3, at 20. Brazil would likely lose, however,
in less competitive industries such as chemicals, paper, and electronics. Id. Hence an
FTAA in which Brazil liberalized trade in its sensitive areas yet gained no greater
access to the U.S. market in its competitive areas would be disastrous from Brazil's
point of view. See, e.g., id. at 19 (suggesting that for Brazil, "a watered-down or
hobbled FTAA might be worse than no agreement at all"); Some Realism For
Mercosur: Better a Genuine Free-Trade Area Than a Phoney Customs Union,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001, at 17, 18 (arguing that "Brazil is right than any FTAA
which did not involve dismantling such protectionist devices as the United States'
farm subsidies and anti-dumping duties might not be worth having").
110. Lenilson, supra note 108. A NAFTA embargo on Brazilian beef imports,
prompted by fear of mad cow disease, "trigger[ed] fierce protests" in Brazil, and even
led to speculation for a time that Brazil might boycott the Summit of the Americas in
Quebec City. Lenilson, Mad Cow Disease May Derail Pan-American Trade Bloc,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
111. See Edward Alden et al., U.S. Push for Free Trade Deal Faces Hurdles:
Americas Pact: US Keen for Accord but Reluctant to Ease Trade Barriers, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.comlglobalarchive/article.html?id=010 2 16
001249 (last visited Feb. 19, 2002); Evelyn Iritani, Payback Time as Countries Protest
U.S. Trade Policies, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at Al. In its position statement on
agriculture, the USTR stresses the importance of "cooperation among FTAA countries
in the WTO negotiations on agriculture to seek the maximum possible improvement
in market access opportunities for agricultural products and the multilateral
elimination of export subsidies for agricultural products." FTAA Negotiating Group on
Agriculture: Public Summary of U.S. Position, http:/www.ustr.gov/regions/
whemisphere/agri.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001). This may reflect recognition that
"Washington and Brasilia have a common interest in the agricultural sector, namely
to reduce trade barriers into the European Union." Lafer Will Oppose Fast Track to
FTAA, supra note 96, at 51. Brazil has not been satisfied to date with the United
States' treatment of these issues, however, and has issued stern warnings that failure
to address agricultural issues up front could result in Brazil's abandonment of the
FTAA entirely, and that increased protection of domestic steel would result in WTO
proceedings. See Brazil Asks U.S. Reps To Reduce Agricultural Subsidies, EFE NEWS
SERVICE, Jan. 16, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Group File; Brazil to Abandon
FTAA Talks Unless Agricultural Subsidies Tackled - Minister, BBC MONITORING
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antidumping laws. Brazil has argued that the United States'
"average tariff or tariff equivalent" on Brazil's most important
exports (45.6%) far exceeds that placed by Brazil on the United
States' most important exports (14.3%). This results in large part,
according to Brazil, from a high tariff rate on frozen concentrate
orange juice (44.7% tariff), and high tariff equivalents on sugar
and tobacco (236% and 350% "extra-quota tariff," respectively)." 2
Brazil also argues that antidumping law, which permits the impo-
sition of a duty "when an exporter sells merchandise in the
importing country at a price below that at which it sells like mer-
chandise in its home country,""' are used by the United States "to
protect sectors such as steel and agriculture from cheap imports" -
viewed by many countries as "rank protectionism.""' Brazil's
Ambassador to the United States has stated that such barriers to
Brazilian exports are "inconsistent with the proclaimed 'free
trade' rhetoric of the United States,"11 5 an argument bolstered by
President Bush's decision to impose significant tariffs on imported
steel."6 The USTR, on the other hand, has reaffirmed the view
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Jan. 18, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source:
Agencia Estado, Jan. 16, 2002, in Portuguese); Brazil Says That US Steel
Protectionism Will Hurt Free Trade Talks, 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 16, 2002,
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020116011961 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2002).
112. See U.S. Tariff Treatment of Main Brazilian Export Products, http://www.
brasilemb.org/trade/Regis%20Text%2OIngles.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001). Brazil
also dislikes the United States' use of agricultural subsidies, demanding that they be
dismantled "as a prior step to the establishment" of the FTAA. Brazil to Raise U.S.
Agricultural Subsidies Before WTO, XymiuA GEN. NEws SERvicE, Aug. 3, 2001,
available at LEXIS, News Group File.
113. Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 8 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1
(1996), reprinted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIAIS
601, 603 (1996); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994) (U.S. antidumping statute); General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. VI, WTO Agreement, supra
note 18, Annex 1A [hereinafter GATT 1994]; 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) (permitting
antidumping and countervailing duties laws within the GATT/WTO regime).
114. Alden, supra note 111; see also Chile-US ITrade Chile Charges U.S. Uses Anti-
Dumping Laws as Threat, EFE NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 3, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Group File.
115. Rubens A. Barbosa, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, U.S. Barriers
On Brazilian Goods and Services, Oct. 2001, http'//www.brasitemb.org/trade/
tradebarriers.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2002); see also Charlotte Denny, Qatar Could
See a First Class Beef, GuARDIAN (London), Apr. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Group File ("The basic gripe of the developing world is that when it comes to trade,
the west says one thing and does another. While protecting its own vulnerable sectors
from competition, it demands that southern countries liberalise .... The Brazilian
government, for one, is sceptical about the US's commitment to the free trade agenda
when Washington regularly uses anti-dumping measures to block imports from its
neighbours and spends Dollars 20,000 a year per farmer on subsidies.").
116. See, e.g., Raymond Colitt et a]., Steel Trade Dispute: World United to Condemn
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that "the FTAA Agreement should make no changes to the WTO
rules on antidumping and countervailing measures and should
ensure the right of each country to maintain and apply trade rem-
edies within the FTAA."117 Indeed many in Congress urge a
stronger U.S. position. A letter to President Bush signed by sixty-
one U.S. senators stated their "strong opposition to any interna-
tional trade agreement that would weaken U.S. trade laws," and
in a concurrent statement Senator Max Baucus warned that "[a]s
the Administration begins its effort to win fast track negotiating
authority, I hope they recognize the handwriting on the wall: new
trade agreements or grants of fast track that endanger key U.S.
trade laws, such as antidumping law, countervailing duty law,
Section 201, and Section 301, will not win congressional sup-
port."1 ' Nevertheless, "Cardoso has acknowledged that Brazil is
seeking ways to boost its exports," and that "this is a prerequisite
for future accords with the U.S."" 9 Brazil, like other Latin Ameri-
can nations, generally opposes inclusion of labor and environmen-
tal provisions in the FTAA.121 Latin America generally views such
US Decision to Impose 30% Tariffs, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, http://global
archive.fl.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020307001902 (last visited Mar. 12,
2002); Steven Pearlstein & Clay Chandler, Reaction Abroad on Steel is Harsh: Bush
Decision to Impose Tariffs Called Setback to Free Trade Effort, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
2002, at E01. Zoellick emphasized that the safeguard could be adjusted if necessary
restructuring did not occur. Press Briefing by U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick, Mar. 5, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200203/20020305-
13.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
117. FTAA Negotiating Group on Subsides [sic], Antidumping and Countervailing
Duties: Public Summary of U.S. Position, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemispheret
subsid.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
118. Senator Baucus on Protecting U.S. Laws in Trade Talks: 61 Senators Sign
Letter to President Bush, May 7, 2001, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/
group8/summitOl/0105070l.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2001).
119. Lenilson, supra note 108. Jose Dirceu, Chairman of Brazil's Workers' Party,
made clear at the 2002 World Social Forum, however, that if his party wins the next
presidential election it will reject the FTAA entirely. Brazil: Free Trade Area of the
Americas Criticized at World Social Forum, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Feb. 2, 2002,
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020202003831 (last visited
Feb. 24, 2002) (text of report by Elizabeth Lopez carried by Agencia Estado, Feb. 1,
2002, in Portuguese). Cardoso insists on protecting Brazil's interests, but urges a
more moderate position on the FTAA. Brazil: President Cardoso: "The FTAA Is a
Market, Not Sovereignty" BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Feb. 7, 2002, http://
globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020207002032 (last visited Feb.
24, 2002) (source: Agencia Estado, Feb. 6, 2002, in Portuguese).
120. See Planned Chile-USA Trade Deal Seen as "A Stab in the Back of Mercosur",
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 4, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group
File (text of report by Denise Chrispim Marin published by Valor web site, Dec. 1,
2000, in Portuguese) (suggesting that Brazil's negative reaction to the announcement
of bilateral negotiations between the United States and Chile stems in part from its
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measures as yet another "disguise to protect domestic
industries."121
At the same time, Brazil is fundamentally uncomfortable with
U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It has been argued
that, "because of the excessive focus on the relationship between
the dominant bipolar system and regions as subordinated sys-
tems" during the Cold War, the "role of middle powers" like Brazil
has been "under-theorised."122 The fact that Brazil has sought
greater autonomy than nations like Mexico in its relations with
the U.S., "even challenging U.S. leadership in the FTAA pro-
cess," 2 ' is consistent with the perception that Brazil views its role
in hemispheric politics as quite different from that of other Latin
American nations. In this respect, it is worth noting that the
United States' relative dominance in trade with Latin America
declines as the focus moves from north to south:
While it is true that we do dominate trade in the northern
part of the hemisphere, having 74 percent of the Mexican
market, 48 percent of the Central American market, and 40
percent of the Caribbean market,... the figure declines to
35 percent of the market of the Andean communities and
only 21 percent of the MERCOSUR market. In fact, in
many years, Japan [sic] and European Union exports to
this region exceed those from the United States.
2 4
MERCOSUR, comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay, 1' is a customs union with the aspiration of becoming a com-
mon market,1 26 and is itself the third largest trading bloc in the
world after the EU and NAFTA.'27 This, in a sense, raises the
stakes of the FTAA for MERCOSUR nations, as they arguably
have more to lose in the way of autonomy achieved, and effort
expended, in subregional2 8 integration than do other negotiating
fear that labor and environmental provisions included in the U.S.-Chile agreement
could be included in the FTAA).
121. Daniel Bradlow et al., The Expanding International Trade Regime: New
Challenges and Opportunities for Legal Practitioners, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 915, 945
(1998); see also Guerra, supra note 3, at 182.
122. CARRANzA, supra note 7, at 7.
123. Id. at 122.
124. Trade in the Americas, supra note 77, at 20 (statement of Philip Stephen
Lande).
125. See supra note 69.
126. CARszA, supra note 7, at 77. Whether MERCOSUR can accurately be
termed a "customs union" is debatable, given its difficulties in maintaining its
common external tariff. See infra text accompanying notes 268-271.
127. CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 76.
128. Use of the word "regional" in connection with the FTAA effort, and
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nations.'2 9 Additionally, Brazil itself feels that it has global com-
petitive potential and finds the United States an "overbearing"
presence in the hemisphere.13 Brazil genuinely "views itself and
in many ways is the premier country of South America and a com-
petitor of the United States,"'' and as such believes in its own
potential to achieve some measure of hegemony in South
America.132 Despite the attraction of U.S. market access, then, the
MERCOSUR nations, and more specifically Brazil, clearly recog-
nize the costs of abandoning their subregional autonomy.
In light of these dynamics, Brazil has sought to increase its
negotiating leverage in two ways - by forging a single South
American negotiating bloc capable of standing up to the United
States, and by courting other trading partners to reduce depen-
dence on the United States.'3 3 As discussed above, U.S. policy-
%ubregional" in connection with South American integration efforts, should not be
interpreted as categorically meaningful. As Carranza has pointed out, '[the concept
of 'region' is highly ambiguous." See id. at 7. The use of "regional" and "subregional"
in this article reflects only that the Western Hemisphere, taken as a whole, is the
'region" of primary interest.
129. Id. at 76 (observing that "[t]he FTAA process creates a particularly
excruciating dilemma for Mercosur, because it is already a customs union and has
gone a long way toward the formation of an autonomous regional trade bloc").
130. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS), THINKING
STRATEGICALLY ABOUT 2005: THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AMERICA 32-33 (1999).
131. Trade in the Americas, supra note 77, at 20 (statement of Philip Stephen
Lande); Brazil: Daily Sees US Haste to Implement Free Trade Pact as Bargaining
Block, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 2, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group
File (text of report by Vicente Nunes published by Correio Brasiliense web site, Mar.
31, 2001, in Portuguese); see also CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 78 (noting that Brazil
accounts for eighty percent of MERCOSUR's population and sixty-five percent of its
domestic product).
132. CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 79. One avenue through which Brazil may seek to
exert greater influence at the global level is the United Nations. It has been reported
that Brazil may seek a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Counsel, and that
President Cardoso may pursue the position of Secretary General. See Daily
Concludes That Brazil's Cardoso Seeks To Become UN Secretary General, WORLD
NEWS CONNECTION, Nov. 8, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.
html?id=011108012724 (last visited Dec. 2, 2001) (text of report by Arthur published
by Jornal do Brasil web site, in Portuguese).
133. Ambassador Rubens Barbosa presented Brazil's priorities as: maintaining its
"diversified structure"; strengthening MERCOSUR; negotiating with other South
American countries; and pursuing the EU and FTAA negotiations. See Rubens A.
Barbosa, FTAA and the Future of Regional Integration: the Brazilian View, at "The
Brazilian Position" http://www.brasilemb.org/trade/FTAAfuture.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2001). The Brazilian magazine Valor has reported Brazil's trade negotiation
priorities as: negotiating a South American bloc with MERCOSUR as its "main axis";
pursuing further negotiations with other Latin American countries; negotiating with
the FTAA and the EU "at the same time"; and establishing friendly relations around
the world toward the end of "an agreement of stances in a possible multilateral
round." Negotiating Priorities and Plans Reported, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
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makers have described the FTAA as reflecting a new "consensus"
in favor of open markets and rejecting protectionist import-substi-
tution policies. 34  Subregional forms of integration such as
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community"'5 are described as hav-
ing "both justified and strengthened the hemispheric consen-
sus," 136 setting the stage for the FTAA to "improve, strengthen,
and transcend all of this."1 37 The manner in which Brazil has pur-
sued South American integration over recent years, however, does
not reflect easy cooperation or "consensus" so much as the pursuit
of its own distinct vision of hemispheric integration. It is widely
thought that the loss of fast track negotiating authority opened up
an opportunity for Brazil to exert greater influence on the FTAA
process. A South American Free Trade Area, or "SAFTA," was
proposed by Brazil in September 1993, but it first garnered signif-
icant attention with the loss of fast track and the resulting inabil-
ity of the United States to extend NAFTA."35 "MERCOSUR's
willingness to expand its membership and network of trade
accords at a time when the United States is immobilized by the
lack of fast track authority makes MERCOSUR a more feasible
option for many countries." 39
BROADCASTS, Oct. 21, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File (text of report by
Denise Chrispim Matin published by Valor web site in Portuguese, Oct. 10, 2000).
This section argues that Brazil's priorities actually reduce to strengthening its
hand in the FTAA through bloc negotiations, while at the same time reducing
dependence on the United States through the establishment of alternative trade
relationships. It is worth noting at this point, however, that establishing useful
precedents for future rounds of multilateral trade negotiations is clearly an important
long-term objective of both Brazil and the United States.
134. See supra text accompanying note 7.
135. The Andean Community, which includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
and Venezuela, was created in 1969 with the signing of the "Cartagena Agreement,"
sometimes referred to as the "Andean Pact"; See Who Are We?, http://www.
comunidadandina.org/ingles/who/who.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2002) (website of the
Andean Community); see also Andean Pact: Official Codified Text of the Cartagena
Agreement Incorporating the Quito Protocol, July 15, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989)
(originally signed May 26, 1969). The Andean Community has set the ambitious goal
of establishing a common market by 2005. Common Market, at http'//www.
comunidadandina.org/ingles/market/market.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
Important near-term goals, however, include consolidating the free trade zone and
applying a common external tariff. Andean Community Presidents Sign Santa Cruz
de la Sierra Declaration in Bolivia, BBC MONITORINa SERVICE, Feb. 1, 2002, at paras.
1, 11, http:/tglobalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020201007755 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2002) (source: Bolivian Information Ministry web site, Jan. 30, 2002,
in Spanish) (providing the text of the Santa Cruz de la Sierra Declaration).
136. Barshefsky, supra note 1, at 4-5.
137. Id at 5.
138. See CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 84.
139. Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment of a
2002] HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION 31
Brazil took advantage of "the vacuum in US leadership"
between the first two Summits of the Americas, making a con-
certed effort to strengthen South American diplomatic relations
toward the goal of SAFTA, 14° and in so doing, won several impor-
tant victories in negotiating the structure of the FTAA. Brazil has
favored slower negotiations to avoid lowering protective tariffs as
long as possible,"' and Brazil's ability to stand with a united
South American bloc at the Belo Horizonte Ministerial effectively
resulted in deferral of decisions on the FTAA negotiating struc-
ture, thereby delaying negotiation of substantive measures.'
4
'
Brazil ultimately achieved several other substantial victories in
the form of the "single undertaking" principle, the creation of a
negotiating group for agriculture, the deferral of environmental
and labor issues, and the endorsement of bloc negotiation.'
With the summit meeting of twelve South American presi-
dents on September 1, 2000, and the subsequent issuance of a doc-
ument called the "Brasilia Communique,"'" the possibility of
coalescing into a SAFTA appeared to be taking more definite
shape. While Brazilian diplomats have disavowed any intention
to create a "confrontation" with the United States and Canada in
the FTAA negotiations,' 5 the document issued by the presidents
at the South American summit makes clear that consolidation of
negotiating leverage is a central aim. Much like the Plan of
Action issued at the first Summit of the Americas,'46 the Brasilia
Free Trade Area of the Americas, LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus., Summer 1996, at 945, 954;
see also Guerra, supra note 3, at 180 (arguing that "[tihe lack of fast track authority
increases the opportunity for MERCOSUR to become the core agreement for the
FTAA").
140. CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 93; see also Guerra, supra note 3, at 180; Jarreau,
supra note 1, at 71.
141. See Jarreau, supra note 1, at 71. (contending that, with regard to the slow
pace of negotiations, Brazil has preferred to place the blame at the door of the U.S.
Congress for failing to authorize fast track). See also Lenilson, supra note 108.
142. See CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 119.
143. Id. at 120, 124.
144. See South American Presidents End Summit, Issue Final Communique, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 5, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File
(source: Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores web site, Sept. 1, 2000) (providing the
English version of the Brasilia Communique).
145. See Foreign Minister Denies Plan to Create Bloc to Counter USA, Canada, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Aug. 30, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group
File (source: 0 Globo web site, Aug. 28, 2000, in Portuguese); South American
Presidents Meet, Pledge Economic Unity, CNN.CoM, Sept. 1, 2000, http://www.
cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/09Ollatam.sumrnit.02/index.html (last visited Sept.
2, 2000) ("Brazilian officials have attempted to calm fears that regional integration
would be a threat to the U.S. vision of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).").
146. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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Communique places hemispheric trade in the broader context of
democratic values and development, 147 and expresses commitment
to other shared hemispheric goals such as fighting drug traffick-
ing and money laundering. 4 1 It also makes clear, however, that
South American interests diverge significantly from those of more
developed nations, emphasizes globalization's "unequal effects on
different groups of countries,"'49 and enumerates shared South
American goals for future trade negotiations. The Brasilia Com-
munique states that "[iut is crucially important that multilateral
trade negotiations adhere to a greater degree of balance and sym-
metry between the rights and commitments of developed and
developing countries" and expresses dissatisfaction with the Uru-
guay Round agreements in this regard, 5 ' and underscores that
liberalizing trade in agricultural goods "is a high priority for
South America."' The document further calls for debt reform,
noting that "for some of the highly indebted South American coun-
tries, the debt service not only constitutes a heavy burden but also
places the countries' stability at risk and seriously compromises
their economic and social development."
52
The statements garnering the most attention, however, were
those concerning regional integration and a common posture
toward the FTAA. Paragraph 31 states that "[tihe heads of state
of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (CAN) decided to
start negotiations leading to the signing of a free trade agreement
between the two groups as soon as possible and, in any case, by
January 2002," and signals approval of pending talks "leading to
Chile's full membership in MERCOSUR.""' These are described
as initial steps "toward the shared goal of creating a broader eco-
nomic and trade area in South America, with the participation of
147. See The Brasilia Communique, Sept. 1, 2000, 1, 5-6, 20-28, at http://www.
mre.gov.br/cimeiralcomunicado-i.htm (website of the Brazilian Foreign Affairs





152. Id. 17. This point appears particularly prophetic in light of Argentina's
social and economic turmoil. See infra text accompanying notes 275-297.
153. Id. 31. Neither has been achieved as of this writing. See infra part IV.
Alignment of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, however, remains a goal of
both groups. Andean Community Presidents Sign Santa Cruz de la Sierra Declaration
in Bolivia, supra note 135, at para. 24; Brazil Seeks Greater Andean Community-
Mercosur Integration, EFE Naws SERVICE, Feb. 15, 2002, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=020215004732 (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
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Chile, Guyana and Suriname"15 4 - effectively a SAFTA. Beyond
stating the bare goal of integration, however, the following
paragraphs discuss its intended impact on the FTAA negotiations:
33. The Presidents of the South American countries reaf-
firmed their understanding that the creation of an
expanded economic area in the region will occur in accor-
dance with the principles of an "open regionalism". This
will strengthen the position of the South American countries
in important negotiations the region wants to see brought to
a successful conclusion, such as those for a free trade area
of the Americas, those aimed at closer coordination with
the European Union, or those in the framework of the
World Trade Organization, among others....
34. The Presidents of the South American countries reaf-
firmed their support to the process of expanding and deep-
ening integration in the Hemisphere. They welcomed the
results of the Fifth Ministerial meeting of the FTAA... and
reiterated their engagement in the gradual establishment
of a free trade areas of the Americas, the negotiation of
which should be concluded by no later than 2005, on an
equitable and balanced basis that will ensure the effective
access of South American exports to markets. To this end,
the presidents decided to intensify the coordination of the
South American countries' negotiating positions.
1 5
This statement maintains a tenuous balance between appearing
constructive and open, on the one hand, and taking a strong nego-
tiating stand on the other. In his statement to the National Press
Club the morning of the summit, Ambassador Rubens Barbosa
walked a similarly fine diplomatic line, characterizing the integra-
tion effort both as "'a building block towards larger hemispheric
integration,"' and as "'intensification of the coordination of South
American countries in negotiating positions in relations to the
FTAA. '" 116 Somewhere between these varying signals of coopera-
tion and confrontation lies the reality of Brazil's approach to the
154. The Brasilia Communique, supra note 147, 1 32.
155. Id. IT9 33-34 (emphasis added).
156. National Press Club Morning Newsmaker Rubens Barbosa, Brazilian
Ambassador to the United States, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 1, 2000 (statement to the
National Press Club), available at LEXIS, News Group File. President Hugo Chavez
of Venezuela, is less guarded. He strongly supports South American integration, and
has stated that the "'FTAA... can't grab us this way and wipe us off the map .... We
need to relaunch negotiations between the blocs because in 2005 we have FTAA.'"
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FTAA; it is willing to talk, but is girding itself to pursue its own
vision of hemispheric free trade. As Cardoso told the press on the
day of the summit, "'[wle are not prepared to open up more our
economies without negotiations which will give us access to rich
countries.'""'
The portion of the Brasilia Communique quoted above also
alludes to a complementary strategy aimed at reducing depen-
dence on U.S. market access. At the same time that Brazil seeks
to consolidate a bloc for greater negotiating leverage vis-a-vis the
United States, it also seeks to build stronger relations with other
current and potential trading partners. 158 In particular, Brazil
has endeavored to maintain concurrent, parallel negotiations with
the FTAA and the EU.155 As noted above, Brazil prefers a slower
pace of negotiation for the FTAA,1 60 and it has not escaped Con-
gress' attention that slower progress toward the FTAA has
157. South American Presidents Meet, Pledge Economic Unity, supra note 145.
158. See, e.g., Mexico: Foreign Secretary on Diplomatic Linkage With Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 31, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Group File (source: Notimex, Mar. 29, 2001, in Spanish) (describing Mexico's
coordination with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile - "what in diplomatic circles is known
as the South American ABC" - regarding the FTAA).
Brazil has also sought greater coordination with Venezuela. See Brazil-
Venezuela: Leaders Meet to Coordinate Americas Summit Policy 3 April, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 1, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source:
Venezuela Online News web site, Mar. 30, 2001); Venezuela's Chavez Meets With
Brazil's Cardoso; Requests Membership in Mercosur, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Apr.
4, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.comlglobalarchive/article.html?id=010404014958 (last
visited Sept. 14, 2001) (text of report by Valderez Caetano published by Jornal do
Brasil web site, in Portuguese). This has raised diplomatic problems for Brazil with
the United States, given that Venezuela's President Chavez, "[slince taking office in
February 1999, . . . has embarked on a crusade to promote close relations with Fidel
Castro, communist China, Iraq and Iran and Russia and has often criticized the
United States." Chavez Urges Venezuela, Cuba "Single Team" Against FTAA
"Cauldron of Hell" BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Sept. 7, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Group File (source: Venezuela Online News web site, Sept. 6, 2001); see also
Brazil: Cardoso To Convey Bush' [sic] Concern to Venzuela's [sic] Chavez, WORLD
NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 2, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.
html?id=010402013932 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001) (text of report by Paulo Sotero
published by 0 Estado de Sao Paulo web site, in Portuguese); Armando Perez,
Venezuela's Chavez Favors Strong Russia, Opposes U.S. Trade Moves, EFE NEWS
SERVICE, May 15, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. Chavez has described
the FTAA as the "'cauldron of hell itself,'" Chavez Urges Venezuela, Cuba "Single
Team" Against FTAA "Cauldron of Hell", supra, and Castro has characterized
Venezuela and Brazil as the twin "resistance" to United States domination of Latin
America. See Cuba: Castro's May Day Speech Rejects US Trade "Annexation", supra
note 51. This likely tends toward a far more direct confrontation with the United
States than Brazil would like. See supra text accompanying note 145.
159. See The Brasilia Communique, supra note 147, I 33.
160. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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allowed nations "to pursue agreements outside of the hemisphere,
particularly with the European Union and countries of Asia."161 In
testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade, Philip Stephen Lande has emphasized
that beyond Brazil's attempt to forge a South American bloc, "the
new threat is the European Union," which could negotiate a free
trade agreement with South America having "a negative effect on
the United States.'
62
Brazil has sought "to play one external trading partner (the
EU) against the other (the US)"1" in order to reduce dependence
on either one, and in fact to set up something of an auction
dynamic between the EU and the United States for a dominant
position in the South American market. Brazil has stated that
2005 is the "absolute limit for an E.U.-Mercosur deal,"6 putting it
on the same schedule as the FTAA negotiations. 15 Thus when the
EU negotiation began to slow over tariff and phytosanitary
requirements, Brazil's Foreign Minister could spur them along by
stating publicly that "'[t]he trend is for increasingly strengthening
ties with the FTAA. I am sceptical about negotiations with the
EU because they are going very slowly." 66 But after the EU Com-
161. Trade in the Americas, supra note 77, at 3 (statement of Congressman Bob
Menendez).
162. Id. at 20 (statement of Philip Stephen Lande).
163. CARRANzA, supra note 7, at 204.
164. Germany Backs Timetable for E.U.-Mercosur Accord, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Oct. 4, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File. Officials have since
stressed, however, that the timetable is fluid. See, e.g., Brazil-EU: Brazil Confident of
an EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, EFE NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 26, 2002, http://
globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020226008586 (last visited Mar.
12, 2002).
165. CARANzA, supra note 7, at 204. Brazil has supported putting the next round of
WTO negotiations on the very same time frame. See Brazil: Graca Lima Expresses
Optimism Over WTO Ministerial in Qatar, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Nov. 5, 2001,
http'//globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=011105013338 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2002) (text of report by D.C.M. published by 0 Estado Sao Paulo web site, in
Portuguese). This schedule was adopted at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference,
and the negotiations will include agriculture, focusing on market access, export
subsidies, and "trade-distorting domestic support." See Ministerial Declaration,
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Nov. 14, 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, at 3 (2001); USTR Fact Sheet Summarizing Results from WTO
Doha Meeting, http'//www.uspolicy.be/Issues/WTOfactsheet. 111501.htm (last visited
Apr. 1, 2002). Both Brazil and the United States have trumpeted this as promising
greater exports for their own domestic producers. Id.; see, e.g., Victory For Brazil in
Agriculture and Medicines, 0 GLOBO, Nov. 15, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group
File.;
166. Brazil: Foreign Minister "Sceptical" About Trade Talks with EU, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 7, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source:
Agencia Estado, Oct. 6, 2000, in Portuguese); see also Negotiating Priorities and Plans
2002]
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missioner for External Relations made a visit to Brazil for the
next set of negotiations to show "the strong commitment and pri-
ority given to the EU-Mercosur negotiations by the European
Union,"'67 and with progress made in those talks on a variety of
issues (including the phytosanitary requirements), the Brazilian
press was speculating that "[n]egotiations for a free trade agree-
ment between Mercosur... and the EU may conclude before the
creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas."'68 When negoti-
ations over the EU's agricultural policies did not progress quickly
enough, however, Brazil then threatened to refocus on the
FTAA. 1 9 Apparently, the hope is that Europe can be pressured
into lowering its agricultural barriers in order to preserve its mar-
ket share in Latin America (avoiding the sort of damage sustained
when NAFTA cut into its exports to Mexico), allowing Brazil and
MERCOSUR to then turn around and push for similar liberaliza-
tion from the United States. 7' Brazil likely overplays its hand in
seeking such a degree of trade disarmament from both the EU and
the United States, 1' but the strategy nevertheless remains an
Reported, supra note 133 (observing that "Mercosur representatives are under the
impression that the EU is dragging its feet regarding negotiations concerning
preliminary subjects, such as the exchange of information on non-tariff barriers").
167. Commissioner Chris Patten Opens Third Round of EU-Mercosur Association
Negotiations, 2000 RAPID, Oct. 31, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
168. Negotiator Sees "Significant Progress" in Mercosur-EU Talks, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 15, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source:
Gazeta Mercantil web site, Nov. 13, 2000, in Portuguese).
169. Brazil-Trade Cardoso: European Protectionism Pushed Brazil Toward FTAA,
EFE NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. Ultimately,
however, MERCOSUR has remained equivocal on the subject. See, e.g., Mercosur Yet
to Decide if Trade Talks with EU or with FTAA to Take Priority, AFX EuR. Focus,
Feb. 1, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (reporting MERCOSUR
administrative secretary Santiago Gonzalez's statement to the effect that "Mercosur
has yet to chose [sic] whether to give priority to trade negotiations with the EU or
with the Free Trade Area of the Americas").
170. See, e.g., Argentine News Agency Says FTAA Could Lead to Opening of
European Markets, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 23, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Group File (text of report by Alberto Galeano published by Telam, Apr. 22,
2001, in Spanish). Mixed messages from MERCOSUR and Brazil continue to keep
the EU on its guard. Compare Raymond Colitt, EU Seeks to Hasten Deal With
Mercosur, FIN. TiMEs, Feb. 16, 2002, http/globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.
html?id=020216001739 (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) (reporting that the EU and
MERCOSUR "are seeking to accelerate free-trade talks") with Brazil: Foreign
Ministry Denies Mercosur to Step Up Trade Negotiations With EU, BBC MONITORING
SERVICE, Feb. 22, 2002, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=
020222004681 (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) (Brazil denying that there has been any
agreement to accelerate such talks).
171. See, e.g., All In the Familia, supra note 3, at 22 (observing that "the talks with
the EU are at least as likely as the FTAA ones to founder on the issue of farm
protection"). Brazil had hoped that a turn back toward the FTAA would force the
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effective one. The EU has recognized that "Mercosur wants to
preserve this balance, to the point of making Europe and the
United States compete with each other," and that "we have to be
on our guard."7'
At the same time, Brazil and MERCOSUR have sought to
diversify further by strengthening trade relationships in Asia.
China has been particularly impressed with the idea of South
American integration, noting the competitive advantages it
offers,'73 and China and MERCOSUR have expressed desire to
"strengthen their cooperation on international affairs and
trade."'74 In talks with both Hong Kong and Singapore, Brazil has
billed itself as an entry point into the South American market,
7 1
and emphasized "the increasing strategic power of the South
French, in particular, to agree to negotiate lower agricultural barriers, and that a
visit by French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin would "breath new life into free trade
negotiations between Brazil and the EU." Brazil-Trade Cardoso: European
Protectionism Pushed Brazil Toward FTAA, supra note 169. Jospin, however, gave no
such indication, rejecting Brazil's focus on agriculture to the exclusion of other issues,
noting that the EU accepts more agricultural exports from Brazil than the United
States does, and stating that "'[t]he world is too complex to be negotiated on the basis
of unilateralism.'" Brazil: Lionel Jospin Noncommittal on Accelerated Mercosur, EU
Timetable, WORLD NEws CONNECTION, Apr. 6, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchivelarticle.html?id=010406012829 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001) (text of
report by Claudia Dianni, "Jospin Rejects Pressure to Open Market," published by 0
Estado de Sao Paulo web site, in Portuguese). Intra-MERCOSUR tensions have even
led the EU to question the viability of continued negotiations, given MERCOSUR's
delay in producing a joint proposal. European Diplomats Concerned About Future of
Mercosur, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, July 2, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=010702014267 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001) (text of
report by Jamil Chade published by 0 Estado de Sao Paulo web site, in Portuguese).
In seeking to "assuage fears that recent divisions within Mercosur could undermine
the chances of an agreement with the EU," Brazil predictably suggested that "talks
with the EU, although complicated, faced fewer obstacles than those with the US ."
Raymond Colitt, S American Trade Bloc Confident of Accord Over Tariff Regime, FIN.
TiMEs, Sept. 12, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.comlglobalarchive/article.html?id=
010912000229 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001).
172. EU Trade Commissioner Lamy Sanguine About FTAA, WORLD NEWS
CONNECTION, Apr. 21, 2001, http://globalarcbive.ft.com/globalarchivelarticle.html?id=
010421008439 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001) (text of interview by Laurence Caramel,
"Three Questions For.. . Pascal Lamy," published by Le Monde web site, in French).
173. See David Hsu, Central and South America Good Markets for Taiwan
Products: CETRA, CENT. NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 12, 2000, http:/www.taiwan.com.au/
Polieco/Trade/SMEsl200010/12.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
174. China, Mercosur Vow to Strengthen Trade Relations, XNHUA GEN. NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 18, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
175. See Chris Oliver, Nation Looks to Region for Trade Partners; Sophisticated
Industrial Base and Expanding Hi-Tech Manufacturing Sector Puts Country at
Forefront of Emerging Economies, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Supplement), Sept.
7, 2000, at 10; Irene Ng, Asia Wants Closer Ties with Latin America, STRAITS TIMES
(SINGAPORE), Sept. 13, 2000, at 1; Singaporean PM in Brazil, Promotes Closer
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American trade bloc." 7 ' Thailand has also discussed the possibil-
ity of closer ties with MERCOSUR as part of its own strategy "to
hone its competitive advantage and forge alliances to increase its
bargaining power," noting that "Mercosur could be a 'stepping
stone' for Thai business... and Thailand could play a similar role
for Latin American firms."' 7
IV. THE U.S. RESPONSE - FRAGMENTING SOUTH AMERICA
Brazil's equivocal strategic and diplomatic response to the
FTAA negotiations reflects its sense that, while free trade would
be beneficial, allowing greater U.S. market access for its exports,
it would suffer under a trade regime in which Brazil makes signif-
icant concessions without securing enough benefits at least to
counterbalance them.7 ' Thus, its strategy of augmenting negoti-
ating clout through the coalescence of a South American bloc is a
sensible one, but so is the United States' counter-strategy. Brazil-
ian efforts to bring South America together as its own trade bloc
have met a concerted U.S. effort to fragment South America
through bilateral negotiation.
Just as Brazilian diplomats have downplayed any intention of
actively confronting the United States in the FTAA negotia-
tions,'79 U.S. diplomats have been outwardly supportive of moves
toward South American integration. Clinton's Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, was "careful to state in Brasilia that she saw
the South American trading blocks as 'components in the con-
struction of the FTAA,' not obstacles to it,"5 0 and Brazilian diplo-
Economic Ties, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 13, 2000, available at LEXIS, News
Group File.
176. Oliver, supra note 175, at 10.
177. Vorapun Srivoranart, Thailand-L America Ties a Must: Strategist, NATION,
Sept. 5, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File. More specifically, however,
Thailand has focused on Chile, noting that their products generally do not compete,
and that "Chile is one of the countries with the best economic stability in Latin
America." See Thailand: Foreign Minister Reports on Trip to Chile, Dialogue with
Burma, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 19, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Group File (source: Than Setthakit, Apr. 19, 2001, at 8, in Thai). An agreement
between Chile and Thailand to serve as mutual entry points into the Latin American
and Southeast Asian markets, respectively, would only raise the cost to Brazil of
failing to ensure Chile's full membership in MERCOSUR. See infra text
accompanying notes 192-203.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 108-121.
179. See supra text accompanying note 145.
180. South American Strategy Advances: Cardoso Takes Further Steps Towards
Regional Leadership, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP.: BRAZIL, Sept. 12, 2000, at 2, available
at LEXIS, News Group File.
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mats have picked up on such comments in their own efforts to
avoid any appearance of confrontation.' From the beginning of
the process, however, the United States favored the creation of the
FTAA through NAFTA expansion on a bilateral basis, which
would give the United States substantial negotiating leverage
over other nations in the hemisphere.12 This would allow the
United States to position itself as a gatekeeper to the FTAA,
exerting great influence over the determination of whether a par-
ticular nation has conformed to the new "consensus" of economic
liberalization sufficiently to receive the merit of U.S. market
access." 3 Beyond this, however, such a structure has the potential
to disrupt subregional integration schemes already in place.
Frank Garcia has argued that while "'piecemeal accession'" to
NAFTA could "provide immediate, appreciable economic benefits
for the acceding RTA [regional trade agreement] member, it may
have significant adverse effects on the non-acceding members of
the RTA and on the RTA itself' as a result of the United States
"'cherry picking' only the most advanced countries for early mem-
bership in the FTAA."' s Benefits flowing to the acceding nation
would include not only increased gains from trade, but also "a con-
siderable advantage in attracting increased foreign manufactur-
ing investment because investors will site their plants in the
accessor in order to gain preferential access into the NAFTA mar-
ket for their goods.""5' This could divert investment from neigh-
boring nations, potentially leading to political and economic
tensions since the "competitive advantages and other gains from
trade which the accessor is likely to realize may fundamentally
alter the economic bases" of the original subregional grouping."8 6
As to whether accession to NAFTA would require accession to the
labor and environmental side agreements, the accession provi-
181. See National Press Club Morning Newsmaker Rubens Barbosa, Brazilian
Ambassador to the United States, supra note 156 ("Albright went to Brazil... and she
was very positive publicly and privately there, speaking about the importance from
the U.S. perspective of this initiative. The stronger the countries in South America,
the more integrated the countries in South America, as the U.S. sees it, the better for
hemispheric integration. And we share that view.").
182. See CARRAizA, supra note 7, at 112, 127; Guerra, supra note 3, at 176; Frank
J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA" A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 539, 540 (1995).
183. See CARRANzA, supra note 7, at 127.
184. Garcia, supra note 182, at 550-51 (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 566.
186. Id. at 569-73.
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sions of the NAFTA agreement187 and the side agreements 18  make
no mention of any such requirement. 89 Given the current political
climate in the United States, however, it seems unlikely that Con-
gress would approve accession to NAFTA without concurrent
accession to the side agreements,19 and the United States would
probably have a much easier time persuading an individual acced-
ing nation to accept them than it would an organized bloc. Adop-
tion of the accession-to-NAFTA model for the FTAA - or any
model based on bilateral negotiation, for that matter - would
appear to create a "prisoner's dilemma" for South America in
which immediate gains for individual acceding nations come at
the expense of what might have been a better negotiated deal for
all of them in the long term. 9'
A successful SAFTA would greatly diminish the United
States' ability to control negotiation of the substance of the
FTAA, 92 and the United States has responded to this threat by
redoubling efforts to negotiate a bilateral agreement with a key
South American nation - Chile. While all South American
nations are clearly essential for a comprehensive SAFTA, Chile's
relatively open economy and "steady growth" have made its mem-
bership in MERCOSUR, and ultimately in SAFTA, particularly
important to Brazil. 93 Chile has remained relatively independent
from the hemisphere's major trade groups, and is unique among
South American nations for having embraced economic openness
as early as the 1970s.'95 The Clinton administration actually tried
to secure Chile's membership in NAFTA in 1995 but failed due to
the loss of fast track authority, Chile being reluctant to negotiate
187. Article 2204 states only that accession is allowed "as may be agreed between
such country or countries and the Commission and following approval in accordance
with the applicable legal procedures of each country." NAFTA, supra note 63, art.
2204(1).
188. Both provide for accession "as may be agreed between such country or
countries and the Council and following approval in accordance with the applicable
legal procedures of each country." NAFTA Labor Agreement, supra note 81, art. 53;
NAFTA Environmental Agreement, supra note 81, art. 49.
189. See Housman, supra note 77, at 303-04.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 91-106.
191. For an in-depth description of the prisoner's dilemma, see ROBERT AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 9-10 (1984).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 133-57 (discussing Brazil's efforts toward
this end).
193. Marcela Valente, Trade-Latam: U.S. Throws Wrench into Mercosur Summit
Agenda, INTER PRESS SERViCE, Dec. 13, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
194. See Jarreau, supra note 1, at 73.
195. See id. at 81. "Chile enacted a foreign investment code in 1974, and its
constitution includes a prohibition against import quotas." Id. (citation omitted).
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its accession twice should Congress choose to amend the deal.'96
In 1996, then, Chile became an associate member of MERCOSUR,
a move thought to have resulted directly from the loss of fast track
and consequent failure to secure NAFTA accession.'97 Brazil and
the rest of MERCOSUR considered Chile's request for full mem-
bership "a triumph," as this "would have represented a reinforce-
ment for the common market project, tending to add to the weight
of the group in international negotiations and favouring the posi-
tion of Mercosur in the talks with the United States for the crea-
tion of the FTAA." 98 Thus the announcement on November 29,
2000 of the commencement of negotiations between the United
States and Chile for "a comprehensive bilateral Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA)"1' was received by MERCOSUR, and particularly by
Brazil, as "a 'stab' in the back" °0 - especially as the announcement
of negotiations with the United States came soon before the
expected announcement of Chile's full membership in
MERCOSUR.20' Full membership was immediately ruled out,20 2
Brazil viewing the negotiations as a "'co-optation' of the US ideas
on the FTAA." °3
Whereas Chile's full membership in MERCOSUR might have
further cemented South American diplomatic and economic rela-
tions, the announcement of their negotiations with the United
States has left MERCOSUR to manage the fundamental rifts
among its existing members with diminished hopes for SAFTA.
Behind their nominal unity lies a history of tense trade relations
between Brazil and Argentina that the MERCOSUR structure has
contained but not eliminated. Recent contentious issues include
196. See Guerra, supra note 3, at 177; Jarreau, supra note 1, at 81; CARRANZA,
supra note 7, at 112.
197. See Guerra, supra note 3, at 177.
198. Planned Chile-USA Trade Deal Seen as "A Stab in the Back of Mercosur'"
supra note 120.
199. Statement By the President: The United States of America and Chile Agree to
Start Negotiations on Comprehensive Bilateral Free Trade Agreement, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 29, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File. President Bush has
identified bilateral negotiations with Chile as a priority. See 2001 International Trade
Agenda, supra note 76, at 4.
200. Planned Chile-USA Trade Deal Seen as "A Stab in the Back of Mercosur",
supra note 120.
201. See Mario Osava, Trade Latam: Chile Excluded from Mercosur Customs
Union, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 14, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
202. The prospect of a free trade agreement with the United States automatically
excludes Chile from membership in the MERCOSUR customs union, but not from the
free trade zone. See id.
203. Planned Chile-USA Trade Deal Seen as "A Stab in the Back of Mercosur',
supra note 120.
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the addition of sugar to MERCOSUR's free trade regime;2" reduc-
tion of the common import tariff on all capital goods;2°5 exports of
Brazilian chicken to Argentina;'" and trade in automobiles.0 7
Generally speaking, Argentina's focus on "primary products" and
Brazil's focus on manufacturing have resulted in a significant
degree of "'Brazil-dependency,' 2 8 and years of recession have led
Argentina to question Brazil's strategy of slowing the FTAA talks,
and even for a period to advocate advancing the starting date to
2004.09 It is crucial to recognize the perception that high
MERCOSUR tariffs on capital goods - maintained in part by slow-
ing FTAA negotiations - have primarily benefited Brazil, provid-
ing protection for its own manufacturers. 10 At this point, Brazil
quite reasonably "fears Argentina may make concessions to the
204. See Mario Osava, Trade-Mercosur: Sugar Deal Blocked by Social and Energy
Issues, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 28, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File;
Marcela Valente, Integration-Mercosur: Economists Outline Cures for Bloc's Ills,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 15, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
205. See Brazil Turns Down Argentine Proposal to Lower Mercosur Tariffs on
Capital Goods, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 11, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Group File (excerpt of report by Maria Luiza Abbott published by Valor
web site, Oct. 27, 2000, in Portuguese). Ultimately Argentina found a unilateral
reduction necessary. See infra text accompanying notes 268-71.
206. See Brazil, Argentina to Settle Chicken Conflict Through WTO, XINHUA GEN.
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 17, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
207. See Valente, supra note 204.
208. CARRANZA, supra note 7, at 194; see also Paul Wonnacott, Beyond NAFTA -
The Design of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, in THE ECONOMICS OF
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 79, 94-95 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind
Panagariya, eds. 1996) (observing that whereas "[a] nation in an FTA [free trade
agreement] ... has an incentive to cut tariffs in situations where its consumers are
paying high prices for goods imported from its FTA partners," a nation in a customs
union like Argentina may "see itself as an exploited market" as a result of its inability
to reduce tariffs unilaterally to import cheaper outside goods).
209. See Chopping Block, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 40; Lenilson, U.S., Brazil
Duel Over Pan-American Trade Bloc, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Group File. Ultimately, however, Argentina has
maintained a stance consistent with Brazil's view that the starting date should
remain as is. When Chile proposed a starting date in 2003, Argentina stood with
MERCOSUR in rejecting the proposal. See Mercosur Rejects Bringing Forward
Deadline for FTAA Negotiations, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 3, 2001,
available at LEXIS, News Group File (text of report by Janaina Figueiredo published
by 0 Globo web site, Jan. 25, 2001, in Portuguese). Chile eventually backed down
from this position. See Foreign Minister Hails Chilean Decision Not to Shorten FTAA
Timetable, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 17, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Group File (text of report by Leandra Peres & Gecy Belmonte, "Chile gives up
on advancing FTAA creation timetable," published by 0 Estado de Sao Paulo web site,
Feb. 11, 2001, in Portuguese).
210. See, e.g. Another Blow to Mercosur: A Decade After It Was Created, South
America's Largest Trade Block Is Losing Direction, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001, at 33.
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U.S." in order to secure direct financial assistance,211 another ave-
nue for the United States' strategy of fragmentation. The civil
unrest, partial debt default, and strained diplomatic relations that
Argentina has endured since late 2001 have greatly raised the
stakes in this regard for both the United States and Brazil, as dis-
cussed below.
212
Even more fundamentally, however, Argentina historically
has disliked Brazil's subregional dominance." 3 The perspective of
"'Brazil as a regional power"' is "especially frustrating for Argen-
tina in the commercial sphere and limits Argentina's autonomy in
foreign policy."214 The perception is that Brazil "see[s] Mercosur as
just a large visiting card to show in its dealings with the outside
world, while Argentina has been desperate for it to offer its firms a
larger market."215 In this light, it should be observed that Brazil
has "stymied efforts led by Argentina to lower the average tariff
on imports coming from outside the trading bloc."216 This may
explain the fact that while Brazil's President Cardoso originally
projected that a SAFTA could be created by the end of 2001,
Argentina's former President de la Rua questioned the plan's fea-
sibility and resisted fixing any deadlines.2"7 Without the benefit of
Chile's full membership in MERCOSUR, this skepticism will be
substantially more difficult to overcome.
In addition, the United States' contribution toward Colom-
bia's drug war, though not directed at fragmenting the continent,
could nevertheless destabilize the region and render SAFTA more
difficult to achieve. The regional difficulties that could result from
"Plan Colombia," to which the United States has made a substan-
211. Lenilson, supra note 209.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 275-97.
213. Brazil's Plan For a Resurgent South America: The Hosts of Today's Brasilia
Summit Hope it Could Mark the Beginning of Regional Dominance for their Country,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=
000901000708 (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
214. Valente, supra note 204; see also CSIS, supra note 130, at 32-33 (observing
that Argentina has historically cultivated a stronger strategic and diplomatic
relationship with the United States than has Brazil).
215. Chopping Block, supra note 209.
216. Jonathan Wheatley, The Mercosur Marriage is in Trouble, Bus. WK., Jan. 29,
2001, at 25; see also Mercosur Summit Bring [sic] Progress But Also Setbacks for
Integration Diplomacy, LATIN Am. REGIONAL REP.: BRAz., Jan. 2, 2001, at I ("Brazil
ended the year by implementing the 0.5% reduction in the common external tariff
.... That much was a success for Brazil, as the other Mercosur countries had wanted
to cut the common tariff by 2 percentage points straight away, but Brazil feared for
the impact on its manufacturing sector.").
217. South American Strategy Advances: Cardoso Takes Further Steps Towards
Regional Leadership, supra note 180.
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tial contribution, include the possibility that drug traffickers and
drug-related violence could spill over Colombia's jungle borders
into neighboring nations, including Brazil, which shares a thou-
sand-mile border with Colombia.21 The Brasilia Communique
devotes significant attention to the topic of combating "illicit drugs
and related crimes in the region,"21' outlining several potential
approaches to the problem.2 Significantly, however, the docu-
ment does not mention Colombia by name in connection with
illicit drugs, and does not signal direct support for Plan Colombia.
Indeed, Brazil has been notably circumspect on the subject,
expressing support for "the peace process in Colombia,"221 and
even for Plan Colombia, yet opposing armed intervention by
Colombia's South American neighbors.222 A destabilizing drug
war spreading beyond Colombia's borders would clearly stress dip-
lomatic relations and problematize the Brasilia Communique's
goals of economic and infrastructural integration,22 rendering a
SAFTA far more difficult to achieve. 4
218. Impact of Colombia's Anti-Drug Campaign Key Issue at South American
Summit, CNN.CoM, Aug. 30, 2000, http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/08/
30/brazil.southamericans.ap/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2000); see also US
President Bush Says Plan Colombia For Entire Region, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Apr. 22, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source: El
Espectador web site, Apr. 21, 2001, in Spanish); Andean Community of Nations
Meeting in Venezuela to Focus on Trade, Drugs, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, June
22, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source: Venezuela Online News web
site, June 21, 2001). The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has
characterized Plan Colombia as the "'military arm'" of the FTAA. Plan Colombia
Seeks to Be "Military Arm" of FTAA - FARC Representative, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Sept. 5, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source: Notimex,
Sept. 3, 2001, in Spanish).
219. The Brasilia Communique, supra note 147, 47.
220. Id. % 47-52.
221. Brazilian Organizer of Summit Interviewed, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Sept. 2, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File (source: Globo TV,
Aug. 31, 2000, in Portuguese).
222. See Impact of Colombia's Anti-Drug Campaign Key Issue at South American
Summit, supra note 218.
223. "Integration and the development of physical infrastructure are two
complementary approaches.... This must be guided by the principles of social and
environmental sustainability and have the ability to attract capital from outside the
region and to generate multiplier effects within it." The Brasilia Communique, supra
note 147, % 37.
224. It has also been argued that given the importance of the U.S. market to
Andean nations, the United States could prevent SAFTA from taking shape with
strategic promises of market access. See C AusNzA, supra note 7, at 98. Given
Venezuelan President Chavez's strong support for SAFTA and an independent South
America, however, such a strategy seems less plausible. See Venezuela's Chief Urges
South American Integration, supra note 156; Lenilson Ferreira, S. America's
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Viewing the U.S.-Chile negotiations within the broader con-
text of U.S. trade relations demonstrates that the United States'
hopes and Brazil's fears... are well founded. It is much easier for
the United States to achieve its goals in a trade agreement
through bilateral negotiations, and Brazil recognizes the danger
that a proliferation of bilateral agreements would present, were it
to abandon the FTAA entirely.226 As discussed earlier, the United
States traditionally employs a strategy in trade negotiations of
securing favorable terms in a bilateral agreement in which it has
significant negotiating leverage, then using that result as a "floor"
in future negotiations and, in this manner, building up a series of
useful precedents.227 Here, the pertinent series of negotiations
actually begins not with Chile, but with Jordan. On October 24,
2000, President Clinton and Jordan's King Abdullah signed the
U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement. 8 In a number of respects, the doc-
ument reads like a trade wish list for the United States, including:
national treatment and the elimination of customs duties on goods
(Article 2); national treatment for services (Article 3); the incorpo-
ration of provisions from a number of intellectual property-related
treaties, and national treatment for intellectual property (Article
4); firm commitments to enforce domestic environmental and
labor laws (Articles 5 and 6, respectively); commitments by each
Presidents Open First-Ever Summit, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 31, 2000, available
at LEXIS, News Group File.
225. See Planned Chile-USA Trade Deal Seen as "A Stab in the Back of Mercosur",
supra note 120; cf. Brazil: Businessmen Fear US Using Weakness To Impose FTAA,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Sept. 24, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/
article.html?id=010924011836 (last visited Dec. 2, 2001) (text of report by Paula
Puliti published by Agencia Estado, in Portuguese).
226. See, e.g., Brazil: Foreign Minister Sets Out Position On FTAA Ahead of Quebec
Summit, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Group File (source: Correio Brasiliense web site, Apr. 16, 2001, in Portuguese)
(Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Lafer stating that should Brazil reject the FTAA, "a
proliferation of bilateral free trade accords between the hemisphere's northern and
southern countries" could occur, leaving Brazil vulnerable to "growing competition on
the North American markets from other Latin American countries that would be
exporting their goods on preferential terms"); Brazil: Lafer on Threats of Possible US
Accords With Other American Countries, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, May 10, 2001,
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010510014973 (last visited
Sept. 14, 2001) (text of report by Claudia Dianni published by 0 Estado de Sao Paulo
web site, in Portuguese); All In the Familia, supra note 3, at 19-20 (Lafer
acknowledging that "his country risks losing much of its existing trade if the rest of
the Americas rushes to sign a deal without it").
227. See Tortora, supra note 74, at 266-67; supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
228. See Press Briefing By U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 24, 2000 (published in two parts), available at LEXIS, News Group
File.
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nation to "seek to refrain from... deviating from its existing prac-
tice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions ...
[and from] impeding the supply through electronic means of ser-
vices subject to a commitment" under the provision on services
(Article 7); commitments to enter into negotiations for Jordan's
accession to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
(Article 9); "safeguard measures" for circumstances in which "the
reduction or elimination of a duty" under the Agreement "consti-
tute[s] a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to a
domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive prod-
uct" (Article 10); incorporation of GATT 1994 Article XX with the
express "understand[ing] that the measures referred to in GATT
1994 Article XX(b) include environmental measures necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health, and that GATT
1994 Article XX(g) applies to measures relating to conservation of
living and non-living exhaustible resources"; and a dispute settle-
ment mechanism (Article 17). 9 As Barshefsky put it, from the
U.S. perspective "[t]his is a very high-quality agreement, covering
every major trade issue and opening up the full range of trade
opportunities."23 The Agreement truly is "path-breaking" in sev-
eral respects. 31 It is the first free trade agreement to include pro-
visions on the environment and labor in the text of the agreement
itself, and also the first to cover electronic commerce.232 Its intel-
lectual property rights protections are described as "the most up
to date standards . . . anywhere in the world.""'
Beyond the value of free trade with Jordan, the Agreement
serves broader purposes for the United States in its general strat-
egy of global trade negotiation. First, it represents an attempt by
U.S. trade negotiators to reconcile inconsistent domestic and
international pressures on labor and environmental issues. The
Clinton Administration's hope must have been that the limitation
of the labor and environmental obligations to enforcement of
existing laws would be acceptable to developing nations, which
229. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area Oct. 24, 2000, http://
www.ustsr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/textagr.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2002)
(website of the USTR) [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement].
230. See Press Briefing By U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, supra
note 228.
231. Id.
232. Id. Recall that under the NAFTA regime, environmental and labor issues are
treated in side agreements. See supra text accompanying note 81.
233. See Press Briefing By U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, supra
note 228.
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generally view such measures as disguised protectionism,234 and to
Republicans in Congress, who generally oppose the inclusion of
such measures in trade agreements.235 At the same time, the hope
must also have been that inclusion of these issues in the text
itself, and the creation of some binding obligations with regard to
labor and environmental standards, would be viewed by domestic
labor and environmental constituencies as an improvement over
the NAFTA regime, which only includes them in side agree-
ments,23 and the WTO regime, in which labor and environmental
concerns are addressed through the limited general exceptions of
GATT Article XX.2s It is certainly possible that such an approach
could satisfy an equivocal U.S. public,3 8 as the focus on enforcing
existing law is not without rhetorical force. Ultimately USTR
Zoellick "oppose [d] suggestions made by some Republicans to strip
the [Agreement] of its labor and environmental provisions," opting
rather "to work with Republicans and Democrats to address their
234. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 121; see also Cox, supra note 94 (noting
Barshefsky's position that "[ploor countries won't agree to U.S. standards but would
consider trade agreements requiring them to be faithful to their own worker-
protection and environmental laws," and observing that "[dieveloping nations
vehemently oppose suggestions by Vice President Gore that countries should face
trade sanctions if they allow employers to abuse workers and pollute. They fear those
measures, backed by U.S. unions, would lock them into Western standards and erase
their advantage as low-cost suppliers of manufactured goods and commodities").
235. See, e.g., Housman, supra note 77, at 311-13; Guerra, supra note 3, at 174;
Lafer Will Oppose Fast Track to FTAA, supra note 96, at 51.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 99.
237. See GATT 1994, supra note 113, art. XX(b) (permitting certain exceptions
.necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health"), art. XX(e) (permitting
certain exceptions "relating to the products of prison labour"), art. XX(g) (permitting
certain exceptions "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption"). Major environmental disputes between the United
States and developing nations, both before and after creation of the WTO, have
focused on the validity of extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws aimed at
protection of the environment. See, e.g., Report of the GATT Panel, United States -
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, unpublished GATT Panel Report (June 16, 1994),
DS29/R, 1994 GATTPD LEXIS 11, at 196 (finding that the Article XX(b) and XX(g)
exceptions to the GATT did not justify extraterritorial enforcement of a U.S. law
banning the importation of fish caught with technology resulting in the incidental
killing of ocean mammals); United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body (Oct. 12, 1998), WT/DS58/AB/R, at 51,
75 (finding that "sea turtles... constitute 'exhaustible natural resources' for purposes
of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994," but that a U.S. law for the protection of sea turtles
from shrimp trawlers violated the Article XX chapeau's prohibition of discriminatory
measures), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu-el58abr.pdf (last visited Mar.
6, 2001).
238. See PIPA, supra note 91.
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differing concerns."239 The Agreement was approved by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, and signed into law by
President Bush,20 but Republican support came only with an
exchange of letters between Zoellick and his Jordanian counter-
part stating each country's intention to settle agreements without
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism or sanctions.241
This angered some Democrats and organized labor, but the labor
and environmental provisions nevertheless remain in the Agree-
ment.242 These letters obviously render application of the Agree-
ment ambiguous, and the effect of such maneuvering may simply
be a deferral of this significant domestic debate - an unacknowl-
edged wait-and-see approach in which the applicability of these
provisions can be argued either way as trade relations with Jor-
dan unfold.
The U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement also establishes a useful
precedent for the substance of future U.S. trade negotiations.
Barshefsky was initially non-committal when asked whether the
labor and environmental provisions would serve as "a potential
template for future trade agreements," stating only that, "as a
general matter, we think we have taken a very sensible course
here."24 Only a little over a month later, however, when the U.S.-
Chile free trade negotiations were first announced, President
Clinton's statement made explicit that the deal "will include labor
and environmental provisions along the lines of the U.S.-Jordan
[agreement]."' With such an agreement between the United
States and Chile, the inclusion of labor and environmental provi-
sions in the text of trade agreements would have precedent in the
239. Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Vows to Work for Compromise Between GOP,
Democrats on Jordan FTA, DAILY LABOR REPORT, Mar. 30, 2001, at A-8, http:l/
subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/dlr.nsf/7f560dcdd4d2099e8525672200509850/580570ad
b3c704fa85256alf0012ed51?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
240. See Edward Walsh, House Approves Jordan Trade Pact, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
2001, at A04; Paul Blustein, Senate Backs Free-Trade Agreement With Jordan, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at E12; President Bush, King Abdullah (transcript of news
conference), Sept. 28, 2001 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A40716-
2001Sep28 (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
241. Walsh, supra note 240, at A04.
242. Id.
243. Press Briefing By U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, supra note
228, pt. 2.
244. Statement By the President: The United States of America and Chile Agree to
Start Negotiations on Comprehensive Bilateral Free Trade Agreement, supra note 199;
see also U.S., Chile Trade Talks to Encompass Labor, Environment, NATL J.'s
CONGRESSDAILY, Dec. 5, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File (stating that the
U.S.-Chile agreement will have "labor and environmental provisions similar to the
U.S. agreement with Jordan").
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Western Hemisphere, and just as Brazil has feared, would sup-
port U.S. demands to include similar provisions in the FTAA
itself.24 While negotiations with Chile have remained a prior-
ity,246 it is unclear to what extent the Bush Administration actu-
ally feels committed to including labor and environmental
provisions like those in the Jordan Agreement. Zoellick's reluc-
tance to remove those provisions from the Jordan Agreement may
suggest that they continue to be viewed as a way forward toward
compromise on these difficult issues. It must also be borne in
mind that if an agreement with Chile fails to include such labor
and environmental provisions, congressional Democrats, organ-
ized labor, environmentalists, and others will all consider it a step
backward."4
It remains plausible that the United States would eventually
push for terms like those in the Jordan Agreement in the Chile24
and FTAA negotiations, and ultimately at the global level through
further WTO negotiations. Indeed, the USTR's FTAA position
statements include summaries of the United States' positions on
labor and the environment, notwithstanding the fact that there
are no negotiating groups for these issues, 241 and the position
statement on investment calls for the inclusion of provisions
ensuring that existing labor and environmental laws "are not
relaxed to attract investment"250 - precisely the approach taken
245. See Planned Chile-USA Trade Deal Seen as "A Stab in the Back of Mercosur",
supra note 120.
246. Rafael Ca As [sic], Bush, Lagos Agree to Conclude Trade Pact and Go On with
FTAA, EFE NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 17, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
247. See, e.g., Blustein, supra note 240, at E12 ("Democrats have insisted that
future trade agreements must include such provisions, arguing that otherwise, free
trade will encourage companies to move operations to the lowest-wage and most
environmentally lax nations.").
248. Difficult issues including labor, the environment, and dispute resolution were
deferred until later rounds of talks. See Chile-U.S. Free-Trade Talks In Final Phase,
Demonstrators Protest, EFE NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 22, 2002, available at LEXIS, News
Group File; Chile and the United States Agree on Further Rounds of FTA
Negotiation, Feb. 28, 2002, http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/02/02-26.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2002).
249. The FTAA and Labor Issues: Public Summary of U.S. Position, http://www.
ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/labor.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001); Environment and
the FTAA: Public Summary of U.S. Position, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/
whemispherelenvir.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
250. Negotiating Group on Investment: Public Summary of U.S. Position, http://
www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/invest.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001). The labor
position statement emphasizes that U.S. negotiators "pressed repeatedly for the
establishment of a study group to address the relationship between FTAA goals and
labor issues," but that opposition by other delegations resulted in the United States
"not obtain[ing] the necessary consensus either to form a study group on labor or to
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with the NAFTA and Jordan agreements (and potentially with the
Chile agreement).2"' While labor and environmental considera-
tions are largely absent from the draft FTAA text in its current
form, it should be noted that the investment chapter at least
includes similar provisions in brackets, 25' leaving the door open for
further discussion of labor and environmental issues as the nego-
tiations progress and potential tradeoffs across issue areas
emerge. The carefully worded instruction to the Negotiating
include labor as an issue for discussion when the Ministers met in San Jose in March
1998." The FTAA and Labor Issues: Public Summary of U.S. Position, supra note 249.
Similarly, the environmental position statement emphasizes that the "USTR recently
initiated a written environmental review of the FTAA and is in the process of
obtaining public comment on the scope of that review." Environment and the FTAA:
Public Summary of U.S. Position, supra note 249. That the USTR considered it
necessary to issue such statements, notwithstanding the lack of negotiating groups
devoted to these issues, suggests the degree to which the USTR remains cognizant of
the domestic-level debate, and the importance of conveying the impression to
domestic labor and environmental constituencies that the USTR has actively sought
to voice their concerns at the negotiating table.
251. The remaining U.S. position statements are also generally consistent with the
trade goals apparent in the U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement and other agreements,
including national treatment on goods and services, see FTAA Negotiating Group on
Market Access: Public Summary of U.S. Position, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/
whemisphere/mkt.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001), and FTAA Negotiating Group on
Services: Public Summary of U.S. Position, http'//www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/
services.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2001); significant intellectual property obligations
and enforcement mechanisms, see FTAA Negotiating Group on Intellectual Property:
Public Summary of U.S. Position, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/intel.pdf
(last visited Mar. 2, 2001); "non-discriminatory" treatment in government
procurement, see FTAA Negotiating Group on Government Procurement: Public
Summary of U.S. Position, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/gov.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2001); safeguard measures upon determination that "the imports in
question are a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to a domestic
industry," see FTAA Negotiating Group on Market Access, supra; and a dispute
settlement mechanism, see FTAA Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement: Public
Summary of U.S. Position, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/dispute.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2001). In addition, the statement on competition policy calls for the
identification of an agency responsible for antitrust enforcement in each nation, and
"supports having rules on official monopolies and state enterprises" resembling those
in the NAFTA. See FTAA Negotiating Group on Competition Policy: Public Summary
of U.S. Position, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/comp.pdf (last visited Mar.
2, 2001). With regard to tariff reduction, the United States has proposed "three
different categories or 'baskets,'" allowing phased tariff reduction in more sensitive
sectors (not specified in the position statement). See FTAA Negotiating Group on
Market Access, supra. The United States has thus far declined to make concrete
proposals in some particularly contentious areas, including the elimination of
"technical barriers to trade," id., and "domestic regulation" in services, see FTAA
Negotiating Group on Services, supra. The USTR also notes that the negotiating
nations will have to deal with "cross-cutting issues" such as "general exceptions, a
national security exception, transparency, taxation, [and] certain definitions." Id.
252. See generally supra note 63.
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Groups included in the Buenos Aires Ministerial Declaration,
stating that "[mlost" Trade Ministers oppose labor and environ-
mental provisions enforceable by trade sanctions,"' should be
noted for its lack of unanimity on this point. While President
Bush has gone on record opposing such use of trade sanctions,254
Zoellick's disinclination to remove such provisions from the Jor-
dan Agreement may nevertheless signal recognition by the Bush
administration that this form of compromise represents a viable
way forward for the United States. 5
Another sense in which the U.S.-Chile negotiations could be
beneficial for the United States comes through in President Clin-
ton's announcement, contextualizing the potential agreement as
expressing a shared vision for the FTAA and the WTO:
This endeavor reflects our mutual commitment to advanc-
ing free and open trade and investment in the Americas
and around the world. The USA and Chile are both strong
supporters of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
negotiations. The negotiation of a bilateral free trade
agreement between us will provide further impetus for the
FTAA negotiations.
The United States and Chile reaffirm their strong commit-
ment to the multilateral trading system and the launch of a
New Round in 2001.156
This statement is clearly intended to communicate U.S.-Chilean
unity with regard to the FTAA and the WTO, further compromis-
ing the viability of a SAFTA and Brazil's negotiating position vis-
A-vis the United States.257 This overall approach to the FTAA
negotiations remains intact under President Bush, with U.S. offi-
cials confirming an effort "to put pressure on Brazil by moving
253. Buenos Aires Ministerial Declaration, supra note 45.
254. See, e.g., Brink Lindsay, How to Open Markets By Example: The US Will Never
Persuade Others to Drop Trade Barriers If It Cannot Defeat Its Own Protectionist
Lobby, FIN. TiMEs, July 6, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.
html?id=010706001491 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001). The USTR web site has
published a "Labor and Environment 'Toolbox,'" but trade sanctions are not included
in the "illustrative list" of measures the United States could employ to further these
goals. See Labor and Environment "Toolbox", http://www.ustr.gov/toolbox.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2001).
255. See Lindsay, supra note 254 (observing that "[miany members of Congress
insist they can support [trade promotion authority] only if certain strings are
attached," including "demands that labour and environmental standards be written
into new trade deals"); text accompanying notes 94-95.
256. Statement By the President: The United States of America and Chile Agree to
Start Negotiations on Comprehensive Bilateral Free Trade Agreement, supra note 199.
257. See Osava, supra note 201.
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rapidly with bilateral trade talks in the hemisphere."258 Zoellick
has stated that "several Latin American nations have expressed
'great interest"' in bilateral agreements like that under negotia-
tion with Chile, and even suggested that the emerging Chile
agreement might serve as a model for others in the region.
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Yet another facet of the United States' victory in winning over
the "coveted prize"' 0 of Chile stems from the fact that Chile, like
Jordan, has agreed to negotiate without fast track. This sends a
message to other Latin American nations that negotiating with a
U.S. executive lacking fast track authority remains worthwhile,
and tends to undercut Brazil's claim that the sluggishness of the
FTAA negotiations has resulted from the lack of fast track author-
ity,262 as opposed to its own concerted effort to slow the pace of
negotiations .23
V. PRACTiCAL RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE FTAA
From Brazil's subregional point of view, the U.S.-Chile negoti-
ations represent a loss both externally and internally. They will
not only allow the United States to establish a powerful precedent
for its own vision of the proper terms of hemispheric integration,
but will also make it much more difficult for Brazil to achieve sub-
stantial South American integration. Brazil's ability to overcome
258. Edward Alden & Geoff Dyer, White House Hard Pressed on Americas Trade
Bloc, FIN. TimEs (London), Mar. 30, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File; see
also Bush Says Will Intensify Efforts to Win Trade Talk Powers From Congress, AFX
(UK), Apr. 17, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010417
012811 (last visited Sept. 7, 2001) (Bush stating that "[mly administration is
committed to pursuing open trade at every opportunity. We will pursue open trade
bilaterally with individual nations such as Chile and Singapore and Jordan").
259. FTAA-US Zoellick: Other Countries Seek Free-Trade Agreement With U.S.,
EFE NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 7, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.
html?id=010407003915 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001); see also Salvadoran President to
Support FTAA at Americas Summit, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2001, http:/l
globalarchive.fL.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010419003638 (last visited Sept. 7,
2001) (source: Notimex, Apr. 17, 2001, in Spanish) (reporting El Salvador's desire for
a free trade agreement with the United States); Bolivia Seeks Free Trade Accord With
USA, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, June 6, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=010606007547 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001) (source: La
Paz La Razon web site, June 6, 2001, in Spanish).
260. Valente, supra note 193.
261. See U.S., Chile Trade Talks to Encompass Labor, Environment, supra note
244.
262. See Lenilson, supra note 108; see also Valente, supra note 193 (arguing that
'Washington's intention is to negotiate with Chile in order to give new momentum to
the [FTAA] and counteract the position of Brazil, which the U.S. government says is
'dragging its feet' in the talks . .. over questions of political competence").
263. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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the loss of Chile and to manage pre-existing tensions within
MERCOSUR will significantly impact the future of the FTAA.
Successful subregional integration in South America will be
very difficult to achieve without significant "convergence of inter-
ests of Argentina and Brazil."" As discussed above, their rela-
tionship is fundamentally strained by a series of trade disputes,
Argentina's uncomfortable economic position of "'Brazil-depen-
dency,"' and a more fundamental dislike of Brazil's emerging sub-
regional hegemony."' Add to this Argentina's partial debt default
and civil unrest, and the future of South American integration
efforts becomes far more difficult to predict.
Whereas Brazil has firmly committed itself to pursuing bloc
negotiation, Argentina's perception of its own interests has
remained much less clear over recent years. As one Argentine
scholar has observed, Argentina has found itself "'in a tricky situ-
ation.'" While it has generally recognized that MERCOSUR could
"'give it a bargaining chip in the negotiations for the eventual
entry into FTAA,"' it has also observed "'the benefits that a coun-
try like Chile can get by getting into a bilateral negotiation with
the US.' ' 66 Brazil has sought to slow the FTAA negotiations in
order to maximize concessions from the United States, while
Argentina has sorely needed faster integration to stimulate its
own failing economy. 7
As Argentina's economic condition continued to falter over
recent years, the rift with Brazil only grew deeper while the pros-
pect of stronger bilateral relations with the United States for a
time grew more attractive. The clearest advocate for stronger
U.S. relations was former Argentine economy minister Domingo
Cavallo, whose economic recovery plan centered on unilateral
elimination of tariffs on capital goods - a move that effectively
gutted "Mercosur's common external tariff policy and its customs
union pretensions," and further weakened Brazil's strategy of
using the common external tariff as a "negotiating chip." '  While
264. See C.ARANzA, supra note 7, at 95-99.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 204-17.
266. Thomas Catan & Raymond Colitt, Mercosur Partners Wrestle with Conflicting
Impulses: The Four Members of the South American Customs Union Are Torn Between
Expansion and Bilateralism, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, http:/globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=001214000642 (visited Feb. 19, 2002) (quoting Juan
Gabriel Tokatlian, professor of international relations at Argentina's University of
San Andres).
267. Id.
268. The plan also called for an increase in tariffs on consumer goods (to 35%).
Thomas Catan & Geoff Dyer, Argentine Emergency Hastens the Decline of Mercosur,
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Argentina consistently affirmed that it would negotiate the FTAA
as part of MERCOSUR,6 s the lack of consensus on this point
among central members of the de la Rua administration only
added to tensions with Brazil. Cavallo remained openly critical of
MERCOSUR, which he wanted to limit to a free trade area, and
he described the prospect of bilateral negotiations with the United
States as "'politically irresistible,"'270 while de la Rua's foreign
minister Adalberto Giavarini favored further subregional
integration.271
The rift with Argentina under de la Rua even began to com-
promise Brazil's strategy of slowing the FTAA talks. Brazil
resisted U.S. efforts to accelerate the process of hammering out
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchivedarticle.html?id=
010403000379 (last visited Sept. 7, 2001); see also Some Realism For Mercosur, supra
note 109, at 17-18 ("Though almost all trade within Mercosur is now duty-free, almost
none of the 'deepening' associated with a customs union has happened."); Another
Blow to Mercosur, supra note 210, at 33.
269. See, e.g. Argentina to Negotiate FTAA Accession Through Mercosur - Stubrin,
AFX EuR., Apr. 4, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchivelarticle.html?id=
010404014321 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001);Argentina: De La Rua Plays Down Cavallo
Comments on Mercosur, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Apr. 22, 2001, http://
globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010422002045 (last visited Sept.
10, 2001) (source: Correio Brasiliense web site, Apr. 21, 2001, in Spanish); Argentina:
Foreign Minister Denies Ruling Out US Proposal for Free Trade Accord, BBC
MONITORING SERVICE, May 10, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.
html?id=010510001208 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001) (source: Telam, May 8, 2001, in
Spanish).
270. Brazil: President Cardoso Suspends State Visit to Argentina, BBC MONITORING
SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=
010405007100 (last visited Sept. 7, 2001) (source: Ambito Financiero web site, Apr. 4,
2001, in Spanish). Brazil's anger at Cavallo's criticisms even resulted in the
suspension of a state visit, id., but at least one member of the Brazilian
administration subsequently suggested a temporary suspension of the common
external tariff. See Alexandra Penhalver, Brazil's Lafer Disagrees With Amaral,
Defends Mercosur Common Tariff, WORLD NEws CONNECTION, Sept. 28, 2001, http'J/
globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010928011274 (last visited Dec. 2,
2001) (text of report by Alexandra Penhalver published by 0 Estado de Sao Paulo web
site, in Portuguese) (reporting "the stand taken by Sergio Amaral, minister of
development, industry, and foreign trade").
271. Brazil: Daily Says Mercosur Contributs [sic] to Divide Argentine Government,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, May 8, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive
article.html?id=010508013965 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001) (text of report by Ariel
Pelacios published by 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, in Portuguese); see also Argentina Calls
For Greater Unity in Mercosur, EFE NEws SERVICE, Sept. 17, 2001, http'J/
globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010917007455 (last visited Oct. 2,
2001) (reporting Cavallo's statements that MERCOSUR's goals were "'exaggeratedly
ambitious'" from the outset, and that further depreciation of Brazil's currency would
force Argentina "to reevaluate its relationship" with Brazil and MERCOSUR, while
Giavarini, "seeking to calm the waters, said his country would not imagine a future
without the cooperation of Brazil").
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their differences by moving up the starting date of their co-chair-
manship by six months, as it has "no interest in creating the
impression that the negotiations are being accelerated before the
United States meets its demand to include on the agenda the
reduction of non-tariff barriers hampering Brazilian exports to the
US market."272 However, Brazil was effectively drawn into accel-
erated trade talks with the United States through revival of
"Four-Plus-One" talks with MERCOSUR. 273 Such talks were more
directly in the interests of Argentina, which previously (and
unsuccessfully) sought acceleration of the FTAA time-frame to
stimulate its own economy, contrary to Brazil's wishes. 4
While it is far too early, as of this writing, to draw firm con-
clusions about the long-term impact of Argentina's recent social
and economic turmoil on the FTAA process, it is nevertheless cru-
cial to recognize the risks and opportunities the United States and
Brazil will likely face in its wake as the negotiations move for-
ward. For over a decade, Argentina "pegged" its peso to the dollar,
fixing a one-to-one exchange rate in order to prevent hyperinfla-
tion like that experienced in the 1980s.275 Over time, however, the
increasing value of the dollar raised the value of the peso beyond
its true worth, which some, particularly the International Mone-
tary Fund ("IMF"), argue has rendered Argentine exports less
competitive, contributing to its recession. 6 At the same time,
272. Brazil: New US-Brazil Trade Group May Help Resolve FTAA Differences,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 1, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/
article.html?id=010401005002 (last visited Sept. 14, 2001) (text of report by Paulo
Sotero, "New Group May Lead to Solutions For FTAA," published by 0 Estado de Sao
Paulo web site, in Portuguese). Brazil, however, did agree to the creation of "a new
mechanism for bilateral consultation that the two countries will establish to discuss
problems related to trade and investments." Not surprisingly, Brazil emphasized
that discussions would not relate directly to the FTAA. Id.
273. See Mercosur, U.S. Set Timetable for Free Trade Talks, XINHUA GEN. NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File; United States Hosts
"Four-Plus-One" Meetings With Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay & Uruguay on
Expanding World & Regional Trade, Sept. 24, 2001, http://www.ustr.gov/releases/
2001/09/01-75.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); United States-Mercosur Four-Plus-
One: Statement: Economic Growth Through Increased Trade, http://www.ustr.gov
releases/2001/09/4pluslstatement.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001) (agreeing to
"redouble our efforts to ensure the successful conclusion of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas no later than January 2005").
274. See Edward Alden, US Eyes Trade Talks With Latin Southern Cone, FIN.
TIMEs, Aug. 23, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=
010823011827 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001); text accompanying notes 209, 267.
275. See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, For IMF, Argentina Was an Unsolvable Puzzle,
WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at E01.
276. Id. Brazil's floating exchange rate permitted a 1999 devaluation, giving Brazil
an advantage in export markets and attracting businesses from Argentina. See No
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Argentina's commitment not to "monetize" (simply printing more
currency) left it to finance its deficits through borrowing,27 7 result-
ing in debts in excess of US$140 billion. 78 The debt problem has
only been exacerbated by longstanding corruption and inefficiency
throughout the Argentine government.27 9 In December 2001, the
situation finally boiled over, as citizens protested significant aus-
terity measures, particularly banking restrictions that Cavallo
had introduced to pay down the debt.28 In the face of riots killing
as many as 28 and leaving numerous businesses looted or
destroyed,28' Cavallo resigned, followed shortly thereafter by de la
Rua." 2 Over the following two weeks, Argentina suspended its
debt payments, amounting to a default,283 and saw four more pres-
idents,2 4 concluding with the appointment of the Peronist
Right Answer?, ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA, Jan. 21, 2002, http://www.economist.
comlagenda/displaystory.cfm?story id=948342 (last visited Jan. 21, 2002); Anthony
Faiola, Devaluation Imminent in Argentina: New President's Success, Economic
Recovery Hinge on Peso's Future, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at A12.
277. See Pearlstein, supra note 275, at E01. It should be noted that with the dollar
"peg" removed, as discussed below, Argentina has almost immediately found itself
tempted to print more pesos to "compensate for a lack of cash." Bloomberg News,
Argentina Poised to Double Money Supply, Risk Inflation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24,
2002, at E2.
278. See Anthony Faiola, Argentines Prepare To Face Fallout of Economic "D-Day",
WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2002, at A01.
279. See, e.g., Brink Lindsay, How Argentina Got Into This Mess, WALL ST. J., Jan.
9, 2002, at A14 (arguing that Argentina's problems result from "the dilapidated state
of its political and legal institutions," resulting particularly from corruption and
"profligacy"); Anthony Faiola, Argentina Gets a New President - Again: Protectionist
Vows to End "Immoral" Economic Policies, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2002, at A01 (noting
that "many economists blame Argentina's collapse on widespread corruption and an
uncompetitive economy"). Disillusionment with the government is thought to factor
into an estimated 40% tax evasion rate among Argentines. See Faiola, supra note
278, at A01.
280. Cavallo "tried to prevent a default on foreign debt by cutting retirees' pensions
and state employees' pay, and slashing social spending at a time of soaring poverty
and a record unemployment rate of 18.3 percent." After the IMF withheld a loan
disbursement in early December 2001, Argentina "partially froze bank accounts and
seized retirement funds to raise money to pay foreign creditors." It was in response to
these latter steps that protests initially broke out. Anthony Faiola, State of Siege in
Argentina, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2001, at A01.
281. Faiola, supra note 279, at A01.
282. Anthony Faiola, Besieged President Resigns in Argentina: Opposition Party
Vows To End Market Policies That Sparked Rioting, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2001, at
A01.
283. Anthony Faiola & Steven Pearlstein, Argentina To Suspend Debt Payment:
Stage Appears Set For Historic Default, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2001, at A01.
284. Upon de la Rua's resignation, Ramon Puerta, head of the Argentine senate,
automatically became president. Soon afterward, Rodriguez Saa was appointed
interim president by the legislature until an election could be held in March. Saa
soon lost support within the Peronist party and resigned. At this point Puerta
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Eduardo Duhalde to fill out the remaining two years of de la Rua's
term.
28 5
Duhalde faces the significant challenge of placating a public
still fuming over austerity measures, while formulating an eco-
nomic recovery plan sufficient to convince the IMF and the U.S.
Treasury Department to extend further loans.2 8 While Duhalde's
early rhetoric emphasized protection of domestic industry and
Argentina's citizens, more recent actions signal recognition of the
necessity of working with international financial institutions.287
"[W]ildly unpopular" banking restrictions"' remain in place,289
and a full devaluation of the peso has occurred.2" And while
stepped down from his position as head of the senate to avoid the presidency, leaving
it to Eduardo Camano, head of the lower house of the legislature, who held the
position pending Duhalde's appointment to fill out de la Rua's term. See Anthony
Faiola, Crisis-Wracked Argentina Seeks Fifth President in Two Weeks, WASH. POST,
Jan. 1, 2002, at A18.
285. See Faiola, supra note 279, at A01. Upon taking office, Duhalde "blamed the
financial collapse of Latin America's third largest economy on the failings of U.S.-
backed free-market policies adopted in the 1990s," branding it an "'immoral'"
economic model, and stated that he would increase state control over the economy and
impose protectionist measures to shelter domestic industries from competition. Id.
Ironically, Duhalde lost to de la Rua in the 1999 elections, having argued for a
suspension of debt payments. Duhalde is "known for his links to many of the same
labor unions that sparked de la Rua's downfall." Id.
286. See, e.g., Faiola, supra note 279 at A12 (noting that Duhalde "may have to tone
down plans for erecting trade barriers to foreign competition in order to secure the
backing of the IMF and the U.S. Treasury Department"); Romance Gone Sour:
Argentina Breaks Up With the Dollar, Jan. 4, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com
ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&content/D=A63435-2002Jan4 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2002) ("For their part, U.S. officials in Washington portray the criticism of
U.S. policy as Argentine fare, directed mostly at a domestic audience by leaders
anxious to reduce discontent in a shaken country. Sooner or later... Beunos Aires
would have to turn to Washington and the international financial institutions based
[there] to obtain a 'sustainable' solution to the crisis.").
287. See, e.g., Jackson Diehl, Dreams of Normality, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2002, at
A17; WORLD/americas/01J29/arge Thomas Catan, Argentina Hopes to Reassure US
On Reform: Carlos Ruckauf Foreign Minister Visits Washington, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2002, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020129000529 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2002).
288. Faiola, supra note 279; Anthony Faiola, In Argentina, Peronism Vs.
Pragmatism: Populist Leader Alters Plans to Meet Reality of Economic Crisis, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 2002, at A01 ("[Duhalde] seems willing to shift his positions to meet the
realities of modern Argentina, which will have to seek fresh support from the IMF
and, in the long run, the return of foreign investors as part of an effort to recover from
financial collapse.").
289. Duhalde's recovery plan lifts restrictions on wages deposited directly into
banks. Argentina Unveils Recover Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2002, at A14.
290. Argentina Unveils Recovery Plan, supra note 289, at A14; Paul Blustein,
Argentina Lets Peso Float: Feared Plunge Fails to Occur Despite Long Lines at
Exchanges, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2002, at E01. The Argentine Supreme Court has
actually held the banking freeze unconstitutional, threatening Duhalde's economic
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banks have been forced to accept payment on certain dollar-
denominated loans in pesos at the pre-devaluation rate,291
Duhalde's administration has stated that banks will be permitted
to pay out dollar-denominated accounts in pesos,292 a move clearly
aimed at convincing the IMF and the U.S. Treasury Department
that Argentina will do what has to be done to save its banking
system.293
recovery plan entirely. Argentina Forced to Revise Economy Plan: Court Ruling
Against Freeze on Bank Accounts Could Jeopardize Financial Institutions, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at A23. Ultimately, however, Duhalde's "government prohibited
Argentines from going to court to take advantage of the... court ruling." Alistair
Scrutton, Argentine Leader Moves Against Court and Banks, WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
2002, at A12.. Argentina initially had a two-tier system with a set rate for exports of
1.40 to the dollar, and a freely floating peso otherwise. This has disappointed
exporters, who saw more to gain from a lower rate (because foreign purchasers could
buy cheaper pesos with which to purchase their exports). Anthony Faiola, No Relief
for Argentine Exporters: Hoped-For Peso Devaluation May Work Against Many
Companies, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at E01. Many feared a full devaluation,
however, because approximately eighty percent of debts in Argentina are dollar-
denominated, while most people actually earn pesos, meaning the pesos they earn
would buy fewer dollars with which to repay their loans. See Faiola, supra note 282.
Anne 0. Krueger of the IMF and Secretary Paul H. O'Neill of the U.S. Treasury
Department both expressed displeasure at the initial two-tier system. See Paul
Blustein & Anthony Faiola, Argentina Told of Conditions for Aid: IMF, O'Neill Urge
Free-Floating Peso, Action to Curb Inflation and Spending, WASH. POST, Jan. 10,
2002, at E01; Anne 0. Krueger, Transcript of Press Briefing (Teleconference) on
Argentina, Jan. 11, 2002, http//www.imf.orgexternal/np/tr/2002/tr02Oll1.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2002) ("In the medium or the longer term, we do not believe that a dual
exchange rate system is sustainable. It requires a number of control mechanics...
which are very difficult to administer and are inconsistent with the growth, or
healthy growth of an economy."). Argentine leaders took issue with this assessment,
with one official replying that IMF representatives "'should talk less if they don't
have anything interesting to say.'" Anthony Faiola, Argentine Accuses IMF of
Meddling: Criticism Is Seen Damaging Efforts Toward Recovery, WASH. POST, Jan.
14, 2002, at A14.
291. See Anthony Faiola, Argentina Sets Sharp Devaluation: Steps Aim to Limit
Consumers' Pain, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2002, at A01.
292. Marc Lifsher & John Hechinger, Argentina Will Pay Bank Deposits in Pesos:
Policy Will Placate Banks, But Is Sure to Frustrate Their Account Holders, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 21, 2002, at A2; Jennifer L. Rich, Argentina Planning a Shift to Pesos, N.Y.
TnmEs, Jan. 21, 2002, at A5; Argentina Unveils Recovery Plan, supra note 289, at A14;
Argentine Leader Moves Against Court and Banks, supra note 290, at A12.
293. Rich, supra note 292, at A5; see also Paul Blustein, IMF, White House Fumble
for a Strategy as Argentina Founders, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002 (noting the IMF's
insistence "that the government ensure the viability of the banking system, which
would mean making bank depositors absorb some of the losses arising from the peso's
devaluation"). To date, Duhalde's economic plan and a trimmed-down budget have
not been enough to please the IMF and U.S. Treasury Department, who still fear for
the future of the banking system. Paul Blustein, IMF's Stony Silence On Austerity
Plans Worries Argentina, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2002, at A20. New limitations on the
ability of provinces to spend central government funds has improved the outlook,
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The ultimate impact on the negotiating positions of the
United States and Brazil remains to be seen, but it should be
observed that this economic crisis places the United States in a
relatively active role with regard to Argentina's future negotiating
alignment. As "dominant shareholder" of the IMF,294 the United
States at least has the opportunity to formulate a strategy and
pursue it, whereas Brazil remains in a reactive posture, save
assuring investors that the "contagion" will not spread its way.2 9
This is not to suggest, however, that the United States will neces-
sarily win Argentina's lasting friendship. The United States (and
IMF) must strenuously avoid demanding reforms considered polit-
ically impossible by Argentine leaders, or run the risk of pushing
this historic ally straight into the arms of Brazil.29 Arguably, the
however. Paul Blustein, IMF, Argentina to Hold Talks on Loan Package: Negotiations
to Begin After Two-month Standoff, WASH. Pos7r, Mar. 1, 2002, at E03.
294. Paul Blustein, Bush Defends Free-Market Path, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2002, at
A02.
295. Significantly, the rest of Latin America has largely been unaffected by
Argentina's economic turmoil. With the exception of Uruguay, "whose economy is
tightly linked to commerce with Argentines," investors have largely recognized that
Argentina's "massive foreign debt, budget deficits and exchange rate controls" make it
"a unique case." Anthony Faiola, Argentine Crisis Sends Few Ripples: Latin American
Markets Are Calm Following Currency Devaluation, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A13.
Nevertheless, Brazilians remain "keen to stress their differences with their troubled
neighbour." Fingers Crossed: Brazil Hopes It Can Escape Collateral Damage,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2002, at 31. Some analysts argue that Argentina's troubles will
ultimately leave MERCOSUR a free trade area at best (rather than a customs union),
and will compromise the "policies and credibility of the United States in Latin
America," especially given the lack of direct support from the United States.
Argentine Economic Collapse Will Affect the Americas: Analysts, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE INTL., Jan. 6, 2002, http://globalarchive.ft.comlglobalarchive/article.
html?id=020106002399 (last visited Jan. 26, 2002). MERCOSUR has reaffirmed its
mission, while acknowledging that more affluent countries and international
institutions are in the better position to dictate an active course. See Mercosur Chiefs
Call For International Support For Argentina, EFE NEws SERVICE, Feb. 18, 2002,
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020218007038 (last visited
Feb. 24, 2002).
296. See, e.g., Faiola, Argentine Accuses IMF of Meddling, supra note 290, at A14
(discussing Argentina's angry response to Anne 0. Krueger's statement that a two-
tier exchange rate would not be "'sustainable,'" and observing that angry comments
in response "reflect frustrations within the new government that the IMF is
underestimating the complex and potentially explosive social situation"); Anthony
Faiola, Argentina Signals Shift Away From U.S.: Rioting Spreads as New Leader
Calls for Latin American Unity Against "Domination", WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2002, at
A14; Larry Rohter, Argentina and the U.S. Grow Apart Over a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2002, at A5 (observing that Argentina has been "stung by the Bush
administration's apparent indifference and lack of assistance during the current
crisis," and that Argentina "now places an especially high priority... on improving
relations with Brazil and the European Union"). In this light, the IMF's decision to
give Argentina a one-year extension on a loan payment comes as no surprise. IMF
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worst-case scenario to result from a heavy-handed approach could
be a Latin American backlash against the very free market princi-
ples motivating the FTAA.297
Brazil, for its part, must endeavor to counteract the percep-
tion that it uses MERCOSUR solely for the attainment of its own
foreign policy goals - "as just a large visiting card to show in its
dealings with the outside world." 9 8 One Brazilian commentator
has noted that "[i]n Brazil there coexist several perceptions of
Mercosur, each traversed by the idea of a bloc adapted to the
nation's own foreign policy, which tends toward fighting the
United States for leadership in South America."" s Brazil is right
that slowing the FTAA negotiations leaves more time to coalesce a
significant negotiating bloc, creating an opportunity to win
greater concessions from the United States. However, it must be
acknowledged that this also squares nicely with Brazil's own
domestic economic interests,300 and that the costs of this strategy
have been borne more directly by Argentina. Indeed, it has been
Extends Argentina's SRF Repayment by One Year, Press Release No. 02/2, Jan. 16,
2002, http://www.imf.orgexternal/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0202.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2002).
297. See, e.g., Blustein, supra note 294, at A02 (reporting that "President Bush
admonished Latin America... against straying from the path of free markets, a sign
of mounting worries in Washington that Argentina's wrenching economic crisis may
lead Beunos Aires and neighboring countries to resort to protectionism and
government intervention," and that Bush will be pursuing a trade deal in Central
America to send "a signal to other countries in the region that if they balk at making
concessions to create the hemisphere-wide FTAA, the United States will cut deals
with those nations that are more eager for free trade"); Latin Trade, supra note 93
(interpreting Bush's announcement of potential trade talks in Central America as a
warning to Argentina and others that "the US had other options for hemispheric
trade liberalisation").
298. Chopping Block, supra note 209; see also Wheatley, supra note 216, at 25
(observing that Brazil "has claimed the lion's share of Mercosur's spoils," and that its
"habit of putting its own interests ahead of those of Mercosur has badly strained
relations between the bloc's members"). Argentina has signaled its "'strong desire to
maintain commercial relations with Brazil and the rest of Mercosur,'" as well as to
continue pursuing the EU and FTAA negotiations. Argentina Promises Not to
"Surprise" Mercosur Partners, EFE NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2002, http://
globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020103006934 (last visited Jan.
26, 2002).
299. Valente, supra note 204 (paraphrasing Pedro da Motta Veiga, head of the
Brazilian Society for the Study of Transnational Firms and Economic Globalization).
300. See Brazil Turns Down Argentine Proposal to Lower Mercosur Tariffs on
Capital Goods, supra note 205 (reporting Brazil's rejection of Argentina's proposal to
reduce MERCOSUR's common import tariff on all capital goods as a reflection of
Brazil's belief "that there are still sectors which need to be relatively protected by the
special 35 per cent tariff," particularly "vehicles, petrochemical, telecommunications
and computer goods which, within Mercosur, are mainly produced in Brazil").
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suggested that MERCOSUR's failure to bring in Chile as a full
member resulted directly from Brazil's insistence on maintaining
high protective tariffs.3"' If Brazil is to hold MERCOSUR together
as a negotiating bloc, and possibly as the core for a larger South
American bloc, it must deal with intra-MERCOSUR distributional
questions302 in what is perceived to be a fair and equitable way. As
one Chilean economist has put it, "Brazil sees Mercosur as a tool
for building a position to confront the United States, and not as a
tool to improve the region's competitive force on international
markets.... [I]f Brazil's intention is to compete with the United
States, it would be better off developing a leadership position that
is less committed to national interests and more in line with the
common interests of the entire bloc."
303
To the extent that Brazil fails to keep MERCOSUR unified in
its approach to the FTAA, it will only make it that much easier for
the United States to capitalize on useful precedents with Jordan
and Chile, to prevent any potential South American bloc from coa-
lescing, and to extract the kinds of concessions that it will need to
get from other negotiating nations on issues such as labor, the
environment, and intellectual property in order to satisfy its own
domestic constituencies' demands. Brazilian policy-makers cer-
tainly recognize the importance of negotiations within
MERCOSUR, 3 4 but must more clearly acknowledge the necessity
301. See The Western Hemisphere Unites, FOREIGN REP., Jan. 25, 2001, available at
LEXIS, News Group File; Valente, supra note 193 (observing that "[w]hile Chile has a
nine percent single foreign tariff, to be slashed to six percent in 2003, the four full
members of Mercosur have staggering duties ranging from zero to 35 percent, and
averaging 14 percent").
302. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 204-09. The recent conflict over the
possibility of adding sugar to MERCOSUR's free trade regime provides a good
example. Argentina, on the one hand, would likely suffer higher unemployment in its
impoverished cane producing region if it removed its import tax on sugar from Brazil,
where production costs are lower. Yet Brazil, for its part, maintains a "program of
adding cane-based fuel alcohol to gasoline" to reduce its dependence on foreign
sources of fuel, a practice which Argentina considers a subsidy of the sugar industry
and a distortion of competition within MERCOSUR. See Osava, supra note 204.
Numerous distributional questions of this sort offer opportunities for trade-offs within
MERCOSUR, allowing the parties to negotiate internally in order to lessen the
temptation of a bilateral deal with the United States, and thus to maintain a united
front in the FTAA negotiations.
303. Valente, supra note 204 (paraphrasing Patricio Meller, economist at the
Corporation of Economic Research for Latin America).
304. See, e.g., Barbosa, supra note 133, at "The Brazilian Position" ("The launching
of the FTAA negotiations in April 1998 represented the greatest challenge for Brazil
and for Mercosul in the coming years: how to reconcile negotiations within the
regional sub-group with those regarding the entire hemisphere .... "); Brazilian
Foreign Minister Says Common Market Key to Mercosur Survival, BBC SUMMAY OF
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of short-term sacrifice to achieve long-term gain.
VI. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS - THE POLITICS
OF REGIONALISM
The recent "proliferation of regionalism" throughout the
world raises the important question of the impact of regional trade
agreements ("RTAs") on the GATT/WTO regime. °5 Given the
ambitious nature of the FTAA undertaking, as well as the com-
plexity and scope of its negotiation, it is important to consider how
the developments discussed above inform theoretical discussions
of the impact of "regionalism" on efforts to improve the multilat-
eral trading system. This final section will argue that regardless
of any purely economic answers to this question, a full under-
standing of the nature and impact of regional trade efforts like the
FTAA requires acknowledgment and comprehension of their polit-
ical meaning - the extent to which regionalism reveals fundamen-
tal fracture lines within and among various nations regarding the
desirable scope and depth of multilateral free trade.
The GATT/WTO regime explicitly permits RTAs. Article
XXIV of the GATT states that "[t]he contracting parties recognize
the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development,
through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the
economies of the countries parties to such agreements,""° ' and goes
on to authorize "the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade
area" subject to the general requirement that its creation must not
raise new barriers to the trade of GATT contracting parties not
participating in the RTA 7.3 0 While this language emphasizes com-
patibility with the GATT, it has been aptly characterized as recog-
nition that "regionalism is an unstoppable trend."3"8
The question of whether RTAs are "stepping stones or stum-
bling blocks""9 on the road to global free trade remains an open
WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 3, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File (text of report
by Denise Chrispim Matin published by Valor web site, Jan. 29, 2001, in Portuguese)
(reporting the belief of Celso Lafer, Brazil's Foreign Minister, that MERCOSUR "will
not be absorbed by the FTAA... if it rapidly fulfils its common market agenda," and
observing that "Mercosur will survive only if it guarantees a more profound degree of
integration than the FTAA").
305. See, e.g., Myung loon Choo, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of Regional
Economic Arrangements and their Effects on the World Trade Organization, 13 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 253, 253 (1999).
306. GATT 1994, supra note 113, art. XXIV(4).
307. Id. art. XXIV(5).
308. Choo, supra note 305, at 254.
309. Id.
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one. Some, notably economist Jagdish Bhagwati, remain highly
skeptical of regionalism. Bhagwati argues that proliferation of
free trade agreements results in trade diversion and creates a
"'spaghetti bowl' phenomenon" of tangled rules of origin that lend
themselves to "protectionist capture." °10 With regard to the West-
ern Hemisphere, Bhagwati has rejected the idea that free trade
agreements like NAFTA and the FTAA pave the road to multi-
lateralism, arguing particularly that NAFTA has only raised polit-
ical divisions more easily elided at the WTO level."' Ultimately,
Bhagwati accepts regionalism only where the goal is a common
market, or when multilateralism is not possible.3 12 On the other
hand, some have argued that free trade areas do offer trade-
enhancing advantages. Paul Wonnacott, for instance, points out
that free trade agreements permit trade liberalization to occur
where the degree of political integration required for a customs
union or a common market is not feasible.113 In particular, he
observes that smaller economies like those in South America
would not want to have a customs union with a common external
tariff largely determined in Washington, and the United States
310. Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas,
in JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ANNIE 0. KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2-5; see also Martin Wolf, Bush's Free Trade Responsibility:
The US President Must Take the Lead in Ensuring the Successful Negotiation of a
New Global Trade Round, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=010425000952 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001) ("The US,
outspokenly opposed to discriminatory trading arrangements half a century ago, is
now among their most convinced advocates."); Guy de Jonquieres, Popular Trend Is
At Odds With Global Free Trade: Regional Trade Agreements, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=011130001667 (last
visited Dec. 2, 2001); cf American Trade, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2001, http'/
globalarchive.ft.comlfglobalarchive/article.html?id=010419001234 (last visited Sept. 7,
2001) (arguing that President Bush "needs to couple his drive for FTAA with an
equally strong effort to launch a new global trade round and to strengthen the World
Trade Organization," as they are "unattainable without US support," and that "a
successful trade round would offer the US and other countries in the Americas a far
larger economic pay-off than would a purely regional liberalisation").
President Bush's enthusiasm for the FTAA to some degree reflects his initial
foreign policy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere. See, e.g., Mary Dejevsky, Bush
Seeking 'Hemisphere of Liberty' at Summit of Americas, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 21, 2001,
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010421000498 (last visited
Sept. 10, 2001); Edward Alden et al., Protesters Greet Leaders to Quebec: Anti-
Corporate Demonstrations: Two Days of Talks on Launching Free-Trade Area Prompt
Opposition But Little Violence, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, http://globalarchive.ft.com/
globalarchive/article.html?id=010421000659 (last visited Sept. 10, 2001); The New
Cosmopolitan, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2001, at 76.
311. Bhagwati, supra note 310, at 11-13.
312. Id. at 8.
313. Wonnacott, supra note 208, at 93.
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likewise would not want this if entering the customs union would
mean that it could not change its tariffs without the consent of
other nations. 1 ' Wonnacott also argues that "[a] nation in an FTA
... has an incentive to cut tariffs in situations where its consum-
ers are paying high prices for goods imported from its FTA part-
ners," whereas in a customs union "with its collective decision
making on the common external tariff, there is greater opportu-
nity for producer interests to triumph and establish a coalition to
set a high tariff or block a tariff reduction."31 Wonnacott's argu-
ment, taking into account the political variables that constrain the
choices of policy-makers, reflects a relatively pragmatic comfort
with the idea of contextualizing economic theory within a broader
set of issues. This touches upon the fundamental reality at the
heart of the free trade debate - the fact that the economics of
trade are constrained by the politics of trade. As John Jackson
has observed, "[alithough we often consider 'regionalism' to be
concerned primarily with economic matters, we must recognize
that there are many 'tie-ins' to non-economic policies .... Some
portion of the attention that we give to the relationship between
the multilateral trading system and trading blocs must take cog-
nizance of non-economic goals."316
The FTAA negotiations reveal significant political con-
straints, along a number of axes, which limit the set of achievable
outcomes. The choices of U.S. trade negotiators are greatly
affected by the demands of a number of domestic constituencies,
including labor, environmental, and business groups, all of which
in turn impact the more general perceptions of the American pub-
lic,317 leaving the USTR with a complex and often contradictory set
of marching orders. Brazil, for its part, encounters significant
constraints in the form of intra-MERCOSUR and South American
relations, which must be carefully managed if Brazil is to achieve
its goal of exerting greater leverage through bloc negotiation of
the FTAA.31 As a result particularly of domestic political pres-
314. Id.
315. Id. at 94.
316. John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 873, 874-75 (1996); see also Rodrik, supra note 106, at 20-21
(observing that "economists and proponents of trade have either neglected or pooh-
poohed some of the broader complications associated with international economic
integration," including "the distributional implications of globalization," and that "the
full story of globalization cannot be told unless these broader issues are addressed as
well").
317. See supra pt. II.
318. See supra pts. III, IV.
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sures, the United States can only pursue broader hemispheric
trade liberalization in certain ways, and likewise as a result par-
ticularly of subregional political pressures, Brazil can only amass
negotiating clout and pursue U.S. market access in certain ways.
The multi-level dynamic apparent in this examination of the
FTAA process accords closely with insights of liberal international
relations theory and multi-level game theory, particularly in their
recognition of the variety of axes along which any particular inter-
national negotiation unfolds. Realism, "It]he dominant approach
in international relations theory for virtually the past two millen-
nia," assumes, first, that "states are the primary actors in the
international system, rational unitary actors who are functionally
identical"; second, that "power determines the outcomes of state
interactions"; and third, that "states can be treated as if their
dominant preference were for power."319 Liberal international
relations theory, in contrast, "begin[s] with individuals and groups
operating in both domestic and transnational civil society....
State behavior is in turn determined not by the international bal-
ance of power, whether or not mediated by institutions, but by the
relationship between these social actors and the governments rep-
resenting their interests, in varying degrees of completeness."2 '
The series of constraints placed upon the USTR in the FTAA nego-
tiations provides a striking example of the centrality of domestic
politics in international relations, particularly through the "fast
track" debate and the related demands of "civil society" constitu-
encies to have their views incorporated into the FTAA process. 21
Robert Strauss has commented that in serving as Special Trade
Representative for the Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations,
"'I spent as much time negotiating with domestic constituents
(both industry and labor) and members of the U.S. Congress as I
did negotiating with our foreign trading partners.'"322 Multi-level
game theory also recognizes these dynamics, emphasizing the
importance of viewing complex international relations in terms of
multiple levels of negotiation. A simple two-level game model
views the negotiations among nations as Level I, and the domes-
tic-level negotiations within each nation as Level II:
319. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International
Economic Law: Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic
Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 722 (1995) (citations omitted).
320. Id. at 728 (citations omitted).
321. See supra pt. I1.
322. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT1L ORG. 427 (1988) (quoting Strauss, citation omitted).
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In this model, the range of agreements for Level I, the
international agreements, that are acceptable to a majority
at Level II, the domestic constituency, constitutes the "win-
set" for that particular country. By viewing the interna-
tional negotiations from the perspective of one country
through the lens of win-sets, it is possible to estimate the
impact of domestic politics on the potential success of the
international stage of the game.1
23
Much like liberal international relations theory, the multi-level
game theorist views international negotiation in light of the set of
possible outcomes acceptable at the domestic level. Ultimately
the extent to which the two sides' "win-sets" converge determines
their ability to reach an agreement at the international level.124
As a corollary, multi-level game theory also suggests that "side-
payments" can be used at the domestic level to control the interna-
tional "bargaining set." 2' Brazil will most certainly find it neces-
sary to make some type of "side-payment" in the form of intra-
MERCOSUR trade concessions contributing to Argentina's eco-
nomic recovery, effectively making a side-payment at the secon-
dary level in order to pursue a favorable negotiating strategy at
the primary level. It may be objected that both liberal interna-
tional relations theorists and multi-level game theorists term the
secondary level of negotiation "domestic," whereas the constitu-
ents of MERCOSUR and the would-be SAFTA are themselves
nations, but this objection misses the fundamental insight. As
Anne-Marie Slaughter has observed, with regard to any given set
of international goals,
[a]ltering positive assumptions about who the principal
actors are in the international system and about the
motives that drive them gives rise to different causal state-
ments about the source of particular problems. These dif-
323. Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic
Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission,
26 ENVTL. L. 95, 109-10 (1996) (discussing the work of Robert Putnam, citation
omitted); see generally Putnam, supra note 322.
324. The definition of a "win-set" as an international negotiation outcome
acceptable to domestic constituencies is closely related to the concept of the "zone of
possible agreement," or "ZOPA," in negotiation theory. Robert Mnookin views
negotiations among individuals in these terms, observing that each participant has a
point at which they are "indifferent between reaching a deal and walking away," their
"reservation value," and that negotiated outcomes are in turn constrained by the
ZOPA, a "bargaining range created by the two reservation values." ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING To CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
DisPUTEs 19 (2000).
325. Schmidt, supra note 323, at 118.
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fering analyses will in turn suggest different political and
legal strategies as to how to resolve those problems in the
service of the posited affirmative goals. 26
As the analysis of this article has suggested, ascertaining the true
nature of the FTAA negotiations and the negotiators' motives
requires acknowledgment of the multiple levels at which political
pressure is exerted upon policy-makers, consonant with recent
recognition among international relations and game theorists that
the interaction of nations amounts to something more complex
than a set of unitary, rational actors pursuing power.
In assessing the future of regional efforts like the FTAA and
their impact on multilateral free trade, then, it is important con-
stantly to reexamine the assumptions and the goals of the process.
Whether regional efforts like the FTAA constitute "stepping
stones" or "stumbling blocks" for multilateral trade depends in
part on the goals WTO members have for the organization. If the
aim is truly absolute free trade at the global level, then it becomes
a simpler matter to dismiss regional free trade areas as "discrimi-
natory," and therefore sub-optimal; 27 in effect, the political debate
is assumed off the table. However, the manner in which the FTAA
process has unfolded suggests that nations, and their constitu-
ents, are anything but clear on what multilateral "free trade"
should mean. The sense of "GATT-frustration"" that led nations
like the United States to pursue regional arrangements during
the Uruguay Rounds; the wide divergences between developed
and developing nations with regard to the process and substance
of hemispheric free trade; and the vocal debates among various
"civil society" constituencies all suggest that regional integration
schemes like the FTAA constitute a dialectical process through
which the proper balance of economic and political goals for trade
policy is debated and negotiated.3 29 This is certainly not to suggest
that the economic debate over whether regionalism results in
faster or slower multilateral trade liberalization is not important.
The point is rather that trade negotiations generally play them-
selves out at the intersection of economics and politics, and that in
this light, the analysis is fundamentally altered; it makes little
326. Slaughter, supra note 319, at 720.
327. See, e.g., Bhagwati, supra note 310, at 2.
328. See supra text accompanying note 72.
329. Cf Jackson, supra note 316, at 877 (arguing that since "the focus has shifted
from tariffs to non-tariff barriers," assessing "trade relations now require[s]
consideration of matters formerly thought to be well within national sovereignty and
matters that are deeply embedded in societal structures and cultures").
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sense to assess regionalism solely in terms of some fixed notion of
"free trade" if regionalism represents a political dialogue aimed
precisely at calling that concept into question. In the FTAA pro-
cess, a number of voices are all straining to be heard at the negoti-
ating table because if it comes to exist, the FTAA will represent
yet another exemplar of trade relations. Hence the U.S. approach
to trade negotiation has been to begin with easier victories at the
bilateral stage, as with Jordan, and then to move progressively
toward more ambitious goals like Chile, and very likely on to the
FTAA, and then toward the ultimate goal of achieving its particu-
lar vision of free trade at the WTO level."' Likewise, Brazil seeks
to establish itself as the center of a unified and strong South
American trade bloc with the immediate goal of achieving more
favorable results at the FTAA level, but its simultaneous talks
with the EU and other potential trade partners make clear that
the FTAA is a component of a truly global agenda. 13 ' Above all
else, these complex negotiating dynamics suggest that in its politi-
cal dimension, the meaning of "free trade" remains very much in
flux, and that the FTAA's most significant ramification may be the
resulting momentum behind a particular blueprint of trade rela-
tions for future global negotiations.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 225-63.
331. See supra pt. III.
